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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to
Utah Code Ann.,§ 78-2a-3(2)((j), in that this matter was transferred from the Utah
Supreme Court, as provided by Utah Code Ann.,§ 78-2-2(4). The Utah Supreme Court
has appellate jurisdiction of the matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 78-2-2(3)(j) as the
case involves an appeal from a final order and judgment of a court of record over which
the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE I
DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERTY TREAT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS AS A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Standard of Review
When a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is presented, the decision to
consider matters outside the pleadings initially lies in the sound discretion of the trial
court. Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977).
Appellate courts will accordingly review for abuse-of-discretion.
ISSUE II
DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO
DEFENDANT-DETERMINING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS TO BE BARRED BY
LACK OF PRIVITY OF CONTRACT AND RES JUDICATA.
Standard of Review
A party's entitlement to summary judgment involves only questions of law.
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Accordingly, the appellate court reviews for legal correctness applying the correctionof-error standard, giving the trial court no particular deference. Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow
Irrigation Co., 813 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 1991); Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 931
(Utah App. 199%); Mumfordv. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 858 P.2d 1041, 1043
(Utah App. 1993). See also Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996); Smith v.
Smith, 793 P.2d 407 (Utah App. 1990).
ISSUE III
SHOULD THIS COURT GRANT DAMAGES TO APPELLEE UNDER RULE
33, U.R.A.P. FOR THE APPELLANT'S TAKING OF A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL
Standard of Review
Whether attorney fees or other damages should be awarded for the taking of a
frivolous appeal is within the sound discretion of the Court of Appeals under Rule 33,
U.R.A.P.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In October of 1975, Reed L. Peterson (deceased father of defendant Curtis
Peterson) and other family members, entered into a written contract with Dale and
Kathleen F. Tubbs, for the sale of the Peterson family farm located at Oneida County,
Idaho. On February 24,1983, the Tubbs assigned their rights under the agreement to
Elwood (brother of plaintiff, F. Stanley Nielsen) and Lynn Nielsen, husband and wife. In
February of 1986, the Nielsens commenced a Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization in the
United States District Court for the District of Utah, and in January of 1988, converted
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said bankruptcy proceeding to a Chapter 7 liquidation. During the pendency of the
bankruptcy, the Petersens and Nielsens entered into an agreement August 6,1986 for the
lease-option purchase of the farm property, subject to approval of the agreement by the
bankruptcy court. In the Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings, the debtors' interest in the
Idaho real property was then abandoned by the trustee, as the amount owing on the
contract exceeded the property value. The abandonment was approved by the
Bankruptcy Court. (Record at 32 and 33).
Defendant, Curtis Petersen, the only person served with plaintiffs original
complaint and therefore made a party defendant to this action, never signed the August 6,
1986 agreement. (Record at 9). Robert Petersen was later served with plaintiffs amended
complaint, but the court never granted leave for the filing of the amended complaint, nor
was court permission to amend ever sought by plaintiff.
Subsequent to the Utah bankruptcy proceedings, the Petersens commenced suit in
December of 1988, in the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Oneida County, State of
Idaho, seeking to quiet title to the Idaho real property, in the matter of Reed L. Petersen
et. al., vs. Elwood L. Nielsen et. al, Case No. CV-88-7-874. On August 21,1991, the
Idaho District Court entered its Memorandum Decision & Order adjudging the August 6,
1986 agreement to be void and unenforceable. (Record at 32). Later, pursuant to a
summary judgment following an amendment of Petersens' complaint, on April 26,1993,
the Idaho District Court entered a further Decree Foreclosing Mortgage and Ordering
Sale, thereby extinguishing any remaining interest of the Nielsens in the real property.
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(Record at 39). Again on November 9, 1994, the Idaho District Court entered its Order
Re: Contempt voiding a "Notice of Claim" that Nielsen had recorded against the real
property claiming the August 6, 1986 agreement to be "in full force and effect." (Record
at 44). The court further adjudged the recording of the notice to be a "contemptible
action" on the part of the Nielsens and awarded appropriate attorney fees. On June 14,
1996, the Idaho District Court entered its final Order Quieting Title to the real property in
favor of the Petersens and against the Nielsens (Record at 48). The Nielsens thereafter
sought relief in the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho, and on November 7,1996, the
Idaho Supreme Court granted Petersens' motion to dismiss the appeal (Record at 52).
Following this extensive litigation, on October 9,1996, Elwood and Lynn Nielsen
assigned their interests, if any, in the lease-option agreement to F. Stanley Nielsen
(plaintiff herein), who then sought to further press the judicially voided claims of his
brother. As a result, on August 6,1999, Reed L. Petersen Investment Company and other
family members brought suit claiming slander of title against Elwood L. Nielsen and F.
Stanley Nielsen in the Oneida County District Court, State of Idaho, Case No. CV-97566. In that case, Nielsens filed their counterclaim seeking relief for breach of the
previously voided August 6,1986 (lease-option) agreement. On April 22,1999, the Idaho
District Court, on cross motions for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings,
entered its Memorandum Decision and Order dismissing the Petersens' slander of title
claim along with the renewed contract claim of the Nielsens. (Record at 134). On May
24,1999, the Idaho District Court entered its Minute Entry and Order denying various
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motions to reconsider. (Record at 159). The Idaho court thereafter entered its Final
Judgment of July 16,1999 fully dismissing Petersens' slander of title suit and Nielsens'
breach of contract counterclaim. On September 11, 1999, the Idaho trial court filed its
Memorandum Decision & Order RE: Costs and Fees awarding F. Stanley Nielsen
attorney fees and costs of $3,536.25 for his defense of the slander of title claim.
Petersens were similarly awarded attorney fees and costs of $1,345.50 for their successful
defense of the renewed contract counterclaim. Attorney fees and costs were denied to
Elwood and Lynn Nielsen.
Apparently displeased with the judgments of the Idaho trial and appellate courts,
and the progress of the Idaho litigation, F. Stanley Nielsen, on January 19,1999, and prior
to the decisions of the Oneida County District Court on the second round of litigation,
brought his complaint in the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, Utah,
serving only defendant Curtis Petersen, who had never signed the August 6,1998
agreement, and naming other family members. (Record at 1). In this Utah action, F.
Stanley Nielsen, for the third time, seeks relief for breach of the August 6,1986 contract
that Curtis Petersen never signed and also damages in tort for malicious prosecution,
namely, the bringing of the Idaho slander of title suit. On February 24,1999, and again
on October 15,1999, F. Stanley Nielsen filed his Amended Complaint, later serving
defendant Robert Petersen, but never sought or received leave of court for the
amendment.
In response to plaintiffs complaint, defendant Curtis Petersen filed his motion to
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dismiss, or in the alternative, for more definite statement and for sanctions, March 2,
1999. Mr. Nielsen then filed his motion for summary judgment seeking judgment for
$130,492.35, well in excess of the prayer of his complaint ($24,550.00), for attorney fees
in obtaining the dismissal of the Idaho slander of title action. In opposition to the
summary judgment request, Curtis Petersen filed affidavits of Philip Patterson, a local
Utah attorney, and Randall Kline, an Idaho legal practitioner. Both indicated that such a
fee would be excessive and unreasonable for a pretrial motion. (Record at 105 and 165).
As requested by both parties, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and
defendant Curtis Petersen's motion to dismiss and for other relief were all argued to the
District Court October 14,1999. After taking the matters under advisement, the trial court,
the Honorable Parley R. Baldwin presiding, entered its Ruling January 31, 2000 and its
Order Granting Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff February 25,2000. From this final
order plaintiff appeals.
STATUTES AND RULES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
Utah Code Ann.,§ 25-5-3:
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale,
of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some
note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom the
lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent there unto authorized in writing.
Rules 33(a) and (b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
(a) Damages for delay orfrivolousappeal Except in a first appeal of right in
a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken
under these rules is eitherfrivolousor for delay, it shall award damages, which
may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable
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attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order that the damages
be paid by the party or by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purpose of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion,
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed
for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as
to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that
will benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion
shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in
Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error or
defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by
any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial otherwise disturbing a
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceedings
must disregard any error or defect in the proceedings which does not affect
the substantial rights of the parties.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. Treating defendant's motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment
when both parties presented matters outside of the pleadings, which matters
were not objected to or excluded by the court, was within the sound discretion
of the trial court. This discretion should not be disturbed.
2.
The trial court was legally correct in granting summary judgment when the
record clearly showed that defendant had not signed the land lease-option contract
Moreover, the claims asserted by the plaintiff were clearly barred by the
application of res judicata and collateral estoppel having been fully litigated
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to a conclusion in the courts of Idaho.
3. Any irregularities in the pleadings filed by either party could not have
affected the substantial rights of the parties or the decision reached by the court
and therefore must be disregarded as harmless error.
4.
Plaintiff has taken this appealfrivolouslyas his position is not warranted
under existing law, and plaintiff has not even attempted to advance a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. As the
appeal was taken for an improper purpose, the court should grant proper damages.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS SOUND DISCRETION IN
TREATING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AS A MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In response to the complaint brought by F. Stanley Nielsen, defendant Curtis
Petersen filed his motion to dismiss and for alternative relief pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
U.R.C.P., along with supporting memorandum and exhibits. Nielsen, in turn, responded
with the filing of his own motion for summary judgment with memorandum and
supporting affidavit of plaintiff. Both parties, through counsel, appeared and argued
all motions pending before the court. As allowed and anticipated by the provisions of
Rule 12(b), both sides presented and argued "matters outside the pleading," which were
considered and not excluded by the court under the provisions of the rule. Such matters
outside of the pleadings included the written decisions of the Idaho trial and appellate
courts. Both sides, without objection, detailed and argued the long and complicated
relationship of the parties, their predecessors in interest, along with the prior and ongoing
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Idaho litigation. At no time during the proceedings did the court, on its own initiative
try to convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment by requesting
additional evidence. Such additional evidence was furnished unsolicited by the parties.
Even after oral argument, Nielsen submitted an additional affidavit and other
memorandum in support of his position. Under such circumstances, it was suitable,
proper, and well within the sound discretion of the trial judge to treat defendant's
dismissal motion as one for summary judgment and to enter judgment accordingly. See
Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. Of Utah, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977); Hill ex rel
Fogel v. Grand Cent Inc., All P.2d 150 (Utah 1970).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ADJUDGING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS BARRED BY LACK OF CONTRACT
PRIVITY AND RES JUDICATA
Contractual Privity
F. Stanley Nielsen brings this action, as assignee of his brother, seeking damages
under the lease-option agreement of August 6,1986. A review of the contract will
demonstrate that the only defendant in the action, Curtis Petersen, never signed and is
therefore not a party to the agreement. Neither is Robert Petersen (served with amended
complaint) a signatory. As a lease or purchase of real property is contemplated, Utah's
Statute of Frauds would render the contract void as to any person not a signatory thereto.
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale,
of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some
note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom
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the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in
writing. Utah Code Ann., Section 25-5-3.
While suggesting that Curtis Petersen was the personal representative or somehow
a successor in interest to his late father, Nielsen never produced any admissible evidence
to support such a claim or even to put such a fact in issue.
Res Judicata
Plaintiffs brother and assignor, Elwood Nielsen, and his wife, were parties to the
first Idaho action brought by the Petersen family to quiet title against Nielsens to the
same real property described in the lease-option agreement. The Nielsens, in turn,
defended this suit claiming the continuing right to exercise the purchase option. The
Idaho District Court found the agreement to be void and unenforceable. Later, the court
entered its decree foreclosing any remaining interest Nielsens could have had in the
property. The Nielsens took an appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and their appeal was
dismissed. Later, in the second Idaho action, Elwood Nielsen, and his brother F. Stanley
Nielsen, brought their counterclaim again claiming breach of the lease-purchase
agreement. In case there was any confusion from the judgment of the first Idaho
court, the second Idaho District Court was very clear in dismissing the Nielsen claims.
Both Elwood and F. Stanley Nielsen have had more than ample opportunity to bring
their grievances to the judiciary. They are not entitled, however, to litigate the same
issues and the same claims until they find afriendlyjudicial ear. The doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel are intended to bring finality to judicial determinations.
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This court had occasion to review the nature and extent of both doctrines in the
recent case of Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675 (Utah App. 1994). In
this case, the court outlined the requirements of res judicata as follows:
In order for res judicata to apply, both suits must involve the same parties
or their privies and also the same cause of action; and this precludes the
relitigation of all issues that could have been litigated as well as those that
were in fact litigated in the prior action. Id. at 667 (quoting Schner vs. State
ex rel UDOT, 657 P.2d 1337, 1340 (1983) and Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588
P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 1978)).
Added to the foregoing, is the requirement that 'the first suit must have resulted
in afinaljudgment on the merits." Madsen vs. Borthick,1r69 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988);
InreJJ.T., 877P.2d 161,163 (Utah App. 1994).
In the instant case, the same cause of action (breach of lease-option agreement)
was twice presented to the Idaho District Court, by the same parties or their privies.
Twice the claim was rejected. F. Stanley Nielsen was a party to the second Idaho suit
and comes here as assignee of Elwood and Lynn Nielsen. In both Idaho lawsuits, final
judgments were entered. Res Judicata therefore precludes the continued litigation of the
contract claim and required the Weber County District Court to grant summary judgment
against F. Stanley Nielsen.
Collateral Estoppel
Somewhat similar to the doctrine of res judicata is the doctrine of collateral
estoppel.
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents the relitigation of issues
that have once been litigated even though the claims for relief may be
Page 11

different. Estate of Covington, at 667, citing with approval, Penrod v.
Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983).
For collateral estoppel to apply, three requirements must be met:
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second,
the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the
first suit or must be one that could and should have been raised in the
first action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment
on the merits. Am. Estate Mgt. v. Intern. Inv. & Dev., 986 P.2d 765, 766
(Utah App. 1999), citing with approval Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245,
247 (Utah 1988); Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 677
(Utah Ct. App. 1994).
From the foregoing, it seems clear that Nielsen's contract claim is not only barred
by res judicata, but as all of the foregoing requirements are met by the Idaho litigation,
collateral estoppel would bar it as well.
Further, Nielsen's second cause of action in tort for malicious prosecution would
be precluded under the collateral estoppel doctrine. This claim, and the issues raised
therein, not only could and should have been raised in the second Idaho case, but to a
large extent were raised and adjudicated.
As noted by this court in American Estate, 986 P.2d 765 (Utah App. 1999), the
Utah Supreme Court has previously defined a "claim" or "cause of action" as:
"the aggregate of operative facts which give rise to a right enforceable in
the courts." A claim is the "situation or state of facts which entitled a party to
sustain an action and gives him the right to seek judicial interference in his
behalf." A claim petitions the court to award a remedy for injury suffered
by the plaintiff. Id. at 767, citing Swainston vs. Intermountain Health Care,
Inc., 766 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1988).
The damage plaintiff complains of in his malicious prosecution claim herein
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is the attorney fees incurred in defending and obtaining judgment on the pleadings in
the second Idaho lawsuit. Indeed, this is the basis of his summary judgment claim of
$130,492.35 made to and denied by the court below. This same attorney's fee issue
was raised by plaintiff in the second Idaho court in his motion for attorney fees and
costs, and as the prevailing party on that issue, the Idaho court awarded him proper fees
of $3,36.25. As he failed to prevail on the contract issue, the court also awarded
Petersens $1,345.50 against him, a net win for Nielsen of about $2,000.00.
Accordingly, as the principal issues relating to Nielsen's present tort claim
were raised and decided in prior foreign litigation, he is now collaterally estoppel to
assert them in a new jurisdiction. The Utah District Court properly disposed of this claim
by granting summary judgment.
POINT III
ANY IRREGULARITIES IN THE PLEADINGS MUST BE DISREGARDED
AS HARMLESS ERROR
As noted by the trial court in its Ruling of January 31,2000, and as a review of
the record will demonstrate, the parties "filed may other motions and pleadings with the
court, many of which contravene established rules of procedure." Such a review will
similarly show that while such irregularities may be present, they in no way impacted
the substantial rights of the parties or the ultimate ruling of the court. Given the obvious
fact that Curtis Petersen, the only person plaintiff choose to serve in the case, did not
even sign the contract in question, along with the extended history of the Idaho litigation,
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the choice for the court was clear. Under such circumstances, Rule 61, U.R.C.P.,
mandates that the court "must disregard any error or defect in the proceedings which does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties." Any defects complained of by plaintiff are
harmless error.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL IS NOT WARRANTED BY EXISTING LAW, AND
IS NOT BASED ON A GOOD FAITH ARGUMENT TO EXTEND, MODIFY,
OR REVERSE EXISTING LAW.
In the case before the court, plaintiff commenced suit for breach of contract in the
District Court of Weber County on a claim he knew to be previously rejected by the
Idaho courts, and indeed still pending in those courts. To compound his error, he joined
as the only party defendant in this matter, a person who never even signed the contract
that he seeks to enforce. Plaintiff made no good faith argument in the court below as to
why the long honored and well know doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel,
under Utah or Idaho law, should be modified or reversed. Again, he advances no such
argument to this court.
Under these circumstances, Rule 33, U.R.A.P., dictates that the taking of such an
appeal is taken for an "an improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in
the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party filing the appeal."
Defendant accordingly respectfully request that the court consider the award of
appropriate damages under Rule 3.
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CONCLUSION
Appellee requests that the court affirm the trial court's order granting summary
judgment against appellant and in favor or appellee.
Respectfully submitted this "!>

day of DecemhefT2000.

&*gO
JOWLTON
Attorney for Appellee
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Certify mailing a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following this
2-*

day of December, 2000, postage prepaid:
Robert L. Froerer
427 27th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401

Daniel L. Hawkley
PO Box 44106
Boise, Idaho 857

Page 15

EXHIBIT "A"
AGREEMENT OF AUGUST 6,1986

EXHIBIT 1

l.^."M.r»l
AGREEMENT

This agreement entered into this JdX day of August, 1986 by and
between Reed L. Petersen and Ethel Petersen, husband and wife, Norman
L. Petersen ana . ' V ^ ' Petersen, husband and wire, !_3vern H. Petersen and
tne Estate of Gecrg 2 :i -etersen, Percy E. Petersen and Inez 6. Petersen,
nusband anc wife [hereinafter r$!zrrt to 3S the "Petersens"]. and Elwocd
L Nielsen and Lynn Nielsen, nusfcand and wife, [hereinafter refered to as
"Nielsen's"], 3na Lynwood Developement Coro., A Utah Corporation.
WITNESSETH;
WHEREAS, uricer the date or October i, 1975, the PETERSEN'S, as
sellers, entered into 3 contract with Dale F. Tubbs and Kathleen F. Tubbs,
buyers, cf Malad, Idaho, whicn contract Is attached hereto as EXHIBIT "A*,
and incorporated herein by reference, 'wnereln and whereby the seller's
agreed to sell and the buyers agreed to purchase, upon the terms,
conditions and orovis'ons therein setferin, all that certlan land, with the
buildings 2nd improvements thereon, erected, situate, lying and being In
the County of Oneida, State of Idaho, and more particularly described as
in said agreement au&cftea hereto as EXHIBIT "A" in writing and legally
described in writing therein, reference is made hereby to the LAND,
BUILDUPS, TERMS, CONDITIONS AND PROVISIONS thereof; and
WHEREAS, said sellers and buyers, established an ESCROW with
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, OGDEN, UTAH, In connection with said
contract, [Hereinafter refered to as the "ESCROW"], arid
WHEREAS, the said agreement was ASSIGNED to the NIELSEN'S by one
certain 'ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT', dated the 24th'day of February 1983,
by tr.e TUBBS, as ASSIGNORS, and the PETERSEN'S as ORIGINAL SELLERS
and VALLEY 3ANK as ASSIGNEE, for and in behalf of ELWOOD L. NIELSEN
AND LYNN NIELSEN ana as TRUSTEE In their behalf. A copy of said
"ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT" is attached hereto as EXHIBIT "B" and also
made a part hereof by reference and according to the terms contained
therein, and

Ey^fSnT

P

•J

i;;:ur>i

WHEREAS, Eccrcmi: and concitio.ns beyond the confol of the
NIELSEN'S causae :hwr to seek shelter u-der "CHAPTER ! 1 CF THE UNITED
STATES EANKRL'PTC'' CODE". AND in orde r tc avcid further ciS*ccmfort and
pf-ooiems 'or the PETERSEN'S End also in the uteres: of tne ESTATE c'
the NIELSEN'S, s.nce the NIELSEN'S nave paid :o the TUEBS ani the
PETERSEN'S thru a Trust for that purpose, very large sums of money,
which present ECONOMIC CONOiTIONS preclude them from securing thru
sale or other/;ise, for the oenef it of,'THE ESTATE".
IT :S HERE5V AGREED * 5 FOLLOWS:
The NIELSEN'S shall request from the BANKRUPTCY COURT, the
reis25e cf the oroserty scld by the PETERSEN'S to TUBBS, (the interest
of TU5S5, having Been satlslflefl), In the CONTRACT, refered to Herein as
EXHIBIT "A* anc also the release cf the ASSIGNMENT Of CONTRACT,
referee to herein as EXHIBIT "3", STRICTLY UPON THE FOLLOWIN3 TERMS
AND CCNOITICNS with no varience therefrom without agreement jp
writing between the parties:
'. The PETERSEN'S shall bid the Farm land into the 1586 Farm Program
known as the 'CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM" and shall recieve the
payments therefrom and pay ali Taxes and Assessments of every Kind and
nature on the property refered to in EXHIBIT "A* fcr the 10 year period of
the Conservation Reserve Contract. They shall further agree to maintain
the property free one clear of any and all encumbrance during said 10
year period.
2. PETERSEN5 hereby lease to the NIELSENS the house, outbuildings,
lane upon wnicn cney are located and that land adjacent thereto and used
for the enjoyment thereof. In addition, PETERSEN'S .ALSO HEREBY LEASE
TC NIELSEN'S any and all land net under contract to the C0NSERVAT1CN
RESERVE PROGRAM tc use only for purposes not In conflict with the rules
and regulations cf said program. This lease shall run concurrent with trie
CONSERVATION RESERVE CONTRACT entered Into by the PETERSEN'S for a
period of 10 years and untlll time allowed for notice of Intent to
exercise option has expired, 180 days following the termination of the
CR? contract. The NIELSEN'S agree to maintain the buildings and fences
during the loss's period and to cause Insurance to De placed upon the
house. The Nielsen's further agree not to encUTnSef me 1655*3 p r e t t i e s '
during said lease period.

3

iz:uni

3. The PETERSEN'S , having rec:eved tne CONSERVATION RESERVE
PAYMENTS FOR THE iO years herecy grant, bargain, and s'el! to, THE
ESTATE", ci tne NIF_5£N"S, an OPTION to pircnase all of the lane,
buildings, attachments anc appurtances discribed in EXHIBIT "A" for the
s u n or $300,000.00, wnich includes interest. PAYABLE IN THREE ANNUAL
INSTALLMENTS OF $60,000.00 EACH, AND THE BALANCE OF $ 1 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ,
IN ONE FINAL PAYMENT, SAiD PAYMENTS MAY BE PAID ANY TIME AT THE

DESCRETiONO- THE BUYER, and upon wrtten notice from tne NIELSEN'S or
their assigns within 130 cteys fall-wing the termination of said
CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM CONTRACT. PETERSEN'S further agree
to piace Wan-arty Deeds in Escrow with this agreement to be delivered.
:o NIELSEN'S or their assigns uccn exercise of the OPTION contained fn
this paragraph, and hereby also agree to provide a policy of TITLE
INSURANCE showing the prooerty to be'free and clear of encumbrance in
the name of the NIELSEN'S or their assigns.
4 inccnsideration for the agreement of the PETERSEN'S to grant said
lease and option. The Petersens, Lyiwcod Developement Corp and
NIELSEN'S agree to the following:
A LYNWCOD Devsicpement Corp. shall recieve s!l proceeds from crops
grown on the Farm during 1966 and shall be r e s o ^ ' h i o f"f **» 'QP-fi >**>
oh or property ***•'•*
B. NIELSEN'S & Lt'NV/OOD further agree that at -the request of the
PETERSEN'S, to cause the CONSERVATION RESERVE ACREAGE, to be
planted to grass as required under the program provided the Petersen's
sign for, and recieve the payments provided for establishment of grass
on the conservattjn acres and pay the payments so recieved or their
equivalent to LYNWCOD DEV. CORP. for providing the material,
equiptment, and labor to plant the conservation reserve.
C This agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, assigns, and
successors tc this agreement.

itfrari
0. 17 ic qrrr,r..,,7p n py THp P / n T S TO TMtc AfiCgFFMgMT THAT-THIS
yt;gT j y A P P P O V - D AND ORpgRgf) RV T H F .lnnffP-flF THF
BANKRUPTS fCtST QT 7-F ! WTFD 5TATFS IM TH? FVPMT HP FAll HRF OF
THF PABT|CS 1N Cgr,.piHfi S1)TH APPROVAL ANnORPFQ TH1* APPFPHFUT
AND AH flF THP TPPMC HFPFOF SH*I I. SF. OF NO FOPCF OP prpPCT AND
THIS FMT'PC AffSFPfi^T SWA11 flg Nil!! AMR VOID
A rppr M FMT

E. !n event of aefaUt of tne terms of tnis agreement -the
prevailing aarty sna" be entitled tc legal fee's and costs'"of
enforcement nerccf.
INV/ITNESS HEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands and
seals this jLl±. aay of-Juty.1986.

y C l ^ / r^-rf^^
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PEED L PETERSEN

/ ;•;...
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ETHEL L PETERSEN
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-O

NCRj?ANjL. PETERSEN^"/

MYME r. PETERSEN

PERC^E. PETERSEN

INEZ-'d PETERSEN

>

>

ESTATE Of 3 E : R G ! A N. PETERSEN 3Y LAVERN'H. PETERSEN

ELW0C0LNI5LSEK

LYNI^NIELSEN

LYNWC6: DEVELCPEMENT CCRP.

WITNESS

by LYNN NIELSEN PRESIDENT

ELWOOD L' NIELSEN. 5EC

EXHIBIT "B"

MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER, AUGUST 21, 1991

IK THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
* »L

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ONEIDA

£ lJ

O-CLCCK.

AT_

REED L. PETERSEN and ETHEL

DATE

PETERSEN, h u s b a " l T a n ^ W i J S E

__4r^fe.-..*/.

JOYCE H. FRElDEMeCRGSS.
Clerk Of District Ccurt

NORMAN L. PETERSEN and MYME
PETERSEN, husband and wife,
LAVERN H. P E T E R S E N a f 0 ^ t h f
H . PETERSEN, ^ ^ p j L r s e n ,
Estate of Georgia N.Petersen,
PERCY E. PETERSEN and INEZ H.
PETERSEN, husband and wife,

CASE NO. 7-874ji
MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER

Plaintiffs,
-vsELWOOD L. NIELSEN and LYNN
NIELSEN, husband and wife,
LYNWOOD DEVELOPMENT CORP., a
Utah corporation; and GRANT
THORNTON, Trustee of the
Bankruptcy Estate of Elwood
Leslie Nielsen and Lynn
Nielsen; DALE F. TUBBS and
KATHLEEN F. TUBBS, husband
and wife; VALLEY BANK AND
TRUST COMPANY, a banking
corporation of Utah,

RECEIVED AUG 2 6 B9I

Defendants.
In October of 1975 the Petersen family entered into a contract
to sell the family farm property in Malad Idaho to Dale and
Kathleen F. Tubbs.

On February 24, 1983 the Tubbs assigned their

rights to the Malad Farm to Elwood and Lynn Nielsen.

This

assignment was accepted by the Petersen family and memorialized in
writing and incorporated the original Petersen-Tubbs agreement.
In February of 198 6, defendants Nielsen filed for Chapter 11,
Stata of Idaho
Coumv of Onaida
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reorganization, bankruptcy in Utah.

During the pendency of the

bankruptcy action, the Petersens and the Nielsens again entered
into an agreement to lease of the farm property.

This "lease

agreement" was dependent upon the acceptance of the bankruptcy
trustee. At that time, the bankruptcy trustee accepted the lease;
however, the bankruptcy estate was then converted to a Chapter 7
bankruptcy, liquidation, in January 1988.
Because the Chapter 11 trustee's approval of the lease was
voidable when the estate was converted to Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the
Malad Farm was again brought back into the bankruptcy estate.

At

this time, the plaintiffs hired a Utah attorney to procure the
release

of

the

property

from

the

bankruptcy

trustee.

The

bankruptcy court has since approved the abandonment of the Malad
Farm from the bankruptcy estate on the grounds that the amount owed
exceeds the current market value of the property.

The plaintiffs

now seek to clear their title to the property.
This Court, on its motion, sought briefing from the parties as
to the effect of the bankruptcy, which agreement or agreements
govern the parties relationship, and, thus, this litigation, and
which state law applies.

At this time, this Court will resolve

those issues.
i.

EFFECT OF BANKRUPTCY AND GOVERNING AGREEMENTS
The conversion of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy to Chapter 7

voided the trustee's prior approval of the lease.

See e.g.

In re

Manchester Lakes Associates, 117 B.R. 221, 224 (1990) ("The lien is
CASE NO. 7-874
MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER
PAGE 2

,ade voidable rather than void in chapter 7, in order to permit the
.ien to be revived if the case is converted to chapter 11....J*
The lease agreement, at paragraph 4.D. specifically provides:
"IT IS RECOGNIZED BY THE PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT THAT
THIS AGREEMENT MUST BE APPROVED AND ORDERED BY THE JUDGE OF
THE BANKRUPTCY COURT OT TSICI THE UNITED STATES. IN THE EVENT
OF FAILURE OF THE PARTIES IN SECURING SUCH APPROVAL AND ORDER.
THIS AGREEMENT AND ALL OF THE TERMS HEREOF SHALL BE OF NO
FORCE OR EFFECT AND THIS ENTIRE AGREEMENT SHALL BE NULL AND
VOID."
A trial court has the discretion to determine whether a
contract is ambiguous or not.

See e.g. Hoffman v. United Silver

Mines, Inc. , 116 Idaho 240, 245, 775 P.2d 1219 (Ct. App. 1989). A
contract which is not ambiguous is construed by the trial court as
a matter of law.
District,

108

As stated in Haener v. Ada County Highway

Idaho

170,

173,

697

P.2d

1185

(1985),

"the

interpretation of the written contract and of the intent of the
parties is a matter for the trial judge's discretion."
This Court finds that the "lease agreement" is not ambiguous.
Therefore, this court may interpret as-a matter of law the meaning
of that contract. The above quoted disclaimer clearly outlines the
parties' intent .to void the "lease agreement" if the bankruptcy
court does not agree to the lease. Although the necessary approval
was, initially, granted, the approval was voidable.

When the

bankruptcy estate was converted from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7
bankruptcy, the approval of the court was voided.

Thus, without

the approval of the bankruptcy court, by its provisions the "lease
agreement" is void.
CASE NO. 7-874
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Thus, in the absence of the lease agreement, the governing
greement must be the written assignment which incorporates the
original Petersen-Tubbs agreement.
Case law clearly demonstrates that abandonment by the trustee
"immediately revests title to that asset in the bankrupt,"

in re

Polumbo 271 F.Supp. 640, 643 (W.D. Virginia 1967)(citing In re
Thomas, 204 F.2d 788, 792 (7th Cir. 1953); See also' Brown v.
O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598, 602, 57 S.Ct. 543, 546, 81 L.Ed. 827 (1937);
Mason v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 646 F.2d 1309, 1310 (9th Cir.
198 0)("When a court grants a trustee's petition to abandon property
in a bankrupt's estate, any title that was vested in the trustee is*
extinguished, and the title reverts to the bankrupt, nunc pro
tunc.11); Wallace v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 338 F.2d 392, 394 n.l
(9th Cir. 1964);
jir. 194 0) .

Rosenblum v. Dincrfelder. Ill F.2d 406, 409 (2nd

Although the removal of the property

from the

banckruptcy estate was accomplished by the Petersen family, the
revision would technically be to the contract purchasers and; thus,
the Nielsens still retain a possessory interest.
The remedies provided for in the assignment and the PetersenTubbs agreement govern continuing possession,
II.

CHOICE OF STATE LAW
The terms of the Petersen-Tubbs agreement, at paragraph 21,

express a choice-of-law agreement for application of Utah law. As
a general principle, contracting parties are free to select the
applicable

state

law

through

CASE NO. 7-874
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a choice-of-law

clause

or the

applicable through a forum clause.

See generally M/S Bremen v.

Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 32 L.Ed.2d 513, 92 S.Ct. 1907
(1972) ; Cerami-Kote, Inc. v. Enerowave Corp.. 116 Idaho 56, 773
P.2d 1143 (1989);

Idaho Code § 28-1-105(1) (applying to the sale

of goods only); Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 187.
However, this general principle is limited by both public
policy concerns and to situations wherein the selected forum state
has a substantial relationship to the parties or transaction. See
e.g. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15, 32 L.Ed.2d
513, 523, 92 S.Ct. 1907 (1972);

Cerami-Kote, Inc. v. Enerovwave

Corp. , 116 Idaho 56, 773 P.2d 1143 (1989);

Idaho Code § 28-1-

105(1) (applying to the sale of goods only); Restatement (Second)
of Conflicts of Laws § 187;

Annotation, Validity of Contractual

Provision Limiting Place or Court In Which Action May be BroughtP
31 A.L.R. 4th 404, 408 (1984).
In the case at hand, it is clear that the State of Utah has
some interest in this contract.

All of the parties are residents

of Utah, the contract was executed in Utah, the defendant is
incorporated in Utah and the bankruptcy proceedings were proceeding
in a federal court in Utah.

However, the real property at issue

is located in the State of Idaho.
According to Zapata, supra, "A contractual choice-of-forum
clause should be held unenforceable if enforcement would contravene
a strong public policy of the forum in which the suit is brought,
whether declared by statute or by judicial decision."
CASE NO. 7-874
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Id. at U.S.

25, L.Ed.2d at 523, citing Bovd v. Grand Trunk W.R. Co.. 338 U.S.
263, 94 L.Ed. 55, 70 S.Ct. 26 (1949).

See accord Cerami-Kote.

supra. By analogy, this public policy concern applies to a choiceof-law

clause

as

well.

Thus,

raising

a

query

"Would

the

application of Utah law to a foreclosure/quiet title action for
real property within the State of Idaho contravene a strong public
policy interest In Idaho?"
As demonstrated by Idaho probate and intestate law, Idaho
asserts the right to have Idaho law govern the distribution of all
real property located in this state but owned by a nonresident
decedent.

This statute, Idaho Code § 15-1-3 01 provides in part:

"Except as otherwise provided in this code, this code applies to
(2) the property of nonresidents located in this state...." Thus,
Idaho statutory law governing probate clearly indicates a statutory
dictate inferring a right to Idaho Courts to govern the title and
right pertaining to land in this State.

By analogy, this public

policy principle may be attributed to.Idaho•s interest in having
Idaho law govern the adjudication and clearing of title or forclose
on real property located within the State of Idaho, even though the
owners, or other parties in interest may be nonresidents and/or may
have agreed to be governed by the law of another state.
The right to determine which party has title to real property
within the State of Idaho should be governed by Idaho law. Thus,
this court will apply Idaho law to the foreclosure proceedings
under the Petersen-Tubbs agreement and assignment.
CASE NO. 7-874
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DATED this 21st day of August, 1991.

WILLIAM H. WOODLAND
District Judge

SufS^S^SSnSi

^POT'DECXSXOH

PAGE 7

. ORDER

«

Broadway-lH* . l o c r - S L C .4101)

EXHIBIT "C"

DECREE FORECLOSING MORTGAGE AND ORDERING SALE, APRIL 26,1993

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ONEIDA
REED L. PETERSEN and ETHEL
PETERSEN, husband and wife,
NORMAN L. PETERSEN and MYME
PETERSEN, husband and wife,
LAVERN H. PETERSEN and
LAVERN H. PETERSEN, Executor
of the Estate of Georgia N.
Petersen, PERCY E. PETERSEN
and INEZ H. PETERSEN, husband
and wife,

CASE NO. 7-874

DECREE FORECLOSING MORTGAGE
AND ORDERING SALE

Plaintiffs,

r I J. g I

vs.

Ar.._"^*l_D.D

ELWOOD L. NIELSEN and LYNN
NIELSEN, husband and wife,
LYNWOOD DEVELOPMENT CORP., a
Utah corporation; and
GRANT THORNTON, Trustee of the
Bankruptcy Estate of Elwood
Leslie Nielsen and Lynn
Nielsen; DALE F. TUBBS and
KATHLEEN F. TUBBS, husband and
wife; VALLEY BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY, a banking corporation
of Utah,

OAfs
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State of Idaho
County of *s)re»3a

1
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Defendants,
CMdfUtoMrialCBW
Oaoucy

THE ABOVE entitled cause came on to be heard before this court on August 31, 1992
on plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. F. Randall Kline, Attorney, appeared for the
plaintiffs, and representatives for the plaintiffs also appeared.

Defendant Elwood Ncilson

appeared pro se.

E x h i b i t "B"

039

The court having reviewed the file, the affidavits submitted and briefs of counsel, being
fully advised in the premises, and having heard arguments of counsel, for good cause appearing;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1. All property as set forth and described in the complaint in this cause and subsequently
particularly described in Exhibit A shall be sold as a unit at a public auction according to law.
2. The plaintiff or any parties to this suit may purchase the property at such sale.
3. The sale is to be made at public auction for cash by the Sheriff of the county of
Oneida. The Sheriff shall retain his statutory fcts, disbursements and compensations out of the
proceeds of the sale, and pay plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney the following sums out of the
remaining proceeds, or as much as die proceeds permit.
4. Assuming the plaintiffs receive die CRP payment in October 1992, the principal and
interest balance at this time shall be set at 5564,338.41, with interest at 12% per annum from
October 1, 1992 to the time of payment as found by this court to be due and owing plaintiffs on
defendants' debts and notes which are secured by the mortgage foreclosed herein.
S 22/814.81

for property taxes paid by the plaintiff, S 11/768.00

as attorneys fees and S 642.40

allowed by this court

to plaintiff as costs for suit and litigation. Plaintiffs

affidavit attached to this Motion sQts forth the amounts he has expended for taxes and attorneys
fees in pursuit of this matter, and the affidavit of F. Randall Kline, current counsel for Plaintiff
Reed Petersen, also sets forth die amounts of attomys fees incurred in die prosecution of this
matter and paid by Reed Petersen,
5. The sheriff shall present receipts of die amounts paid as stated above to this court
together with die Sheriffs return and die report of sale. The sheriff shall return any surplus
Decree for Closing Mortgage and Ordering Sale
Page 2

monies which may remain after applying the proceeds of sale as designated within ten days after
making the sale. Such surplus, if any, shall abide the further order of this court.
6. The defendants Elwood and Lynn Nielsen are personally liable for the amounts set
forth above, and should the proceeds of sale be insufficient to pay those sums, the court will
render a judgment against the defendants and each of them for the deficient amount, and the
court retains jurisdiction for that purpose.
7. The sheriff shall execute and deliver a deed to the property to the purchasers at the
sale, and the purchasers shall be let into possession of the property.
8. The defendants and all persons claiming under them be and are hereby forever barred
and foreclosed of all equity and redemption and claim to the mortgage, and all parts of the
mortgage property, except for such right of redemption as they may have by law from the sale.
9. The plaintiffs are placed in the position of receiver with regard to the property to
manage, control and possess the property until such time of sale.
10. Defendants and each of them and their agents are enjoined from committing any
waste upon the premises.
11. The defendants and each of them are allowed and permitted ten days from the date
of this order to remove any items of personal property including farm equipment from the
premises.

However, no fixtures shall be removed and no waste shall be committed on the

premises.
12.

The defendants are currendy growing a crop of safflower on the premises of

approximately 140 acres. The defendants shall be allowed to enter the premises to harvest the

Decree for Closing Mortgage and Ordering Sale
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crop at the appropriate time and receive proceeds from die crop, including disaster or insurance
payments on said crop.
SO ORDERED this

j

ff

day of-<Jd&M- 1993

STRICT C(5URTJLJDGE
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, HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ^ i ^
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*Y < * & & * » « . < « * « * « " » *

correct copy of the foregoing document to the Mowing person(s) as follows:
I f U.S. Mail postage prepaid
[ | Hand Delivery
I 1 Express Delivery

Elwood & Lynn Nielsen
P.O. Box 1944
Sandy, UT 84091
Brad R. Baldwin
50 West Broadway, Eleventh Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

\^\},S. Mail postage prepaid
[ J Hand Delivery
[ 1 Express Delivery
(L^U.S. Mail postage prepaid
[ J Hand Delivery
I ] Express Delivery

E. L. Scott
P.O. Box 145
44 North Main
Malad, ID 83252

U.S. Mail Postage prepaid

F. Randall Kline
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 397
Pocatello, ID 83204
^LWssfu

Clerk of the Court
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EXHIBIT "D"
ORDER RE: CONTEMPT, NOVEMBER 9, 1994

(Hi £D
gr.n&T^S.; aaccsc.^..,v.

F. Randall Kline. Esauire
F. RANDALL KLINE, CHARTERED
427 N. Main St.. Suite L

DATS

H-'D-.4.if.

JCYC2 H. FxE!CEN££=.Gc3.
Clerk erf CisUta Caxr

P.O. Box 397

Pocateilo. Idaho 83204-0397
Telephone: (208) 232-9007
OfPUTY

Attorney for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ONEIDA
REED L. PETERSEN and ETHEL
PETERSEN, husband and wife, et al.

Case No. CV 88-7,874
Judge: Woodland

Plaintiff,
ORDER RE: CONTEMPT
vs.

ELWOOD L. NIELSEN and LYNN
NIELSEN, husband and wife.
Defendants.
The matter of an Order to Show Cause for Contempt having come before the
Court on or about September 30, 1994, F. Randall Kline appeared for the Plaintiffs, and Fred
J. Lewis appeared for the defendants. The matter before the Court is an Order to Show Cause
for Contempt relative to two specific instances.
The first matter deals with the preparation and recording in me real estate records
of Oneida County, a document entitled "Notice of Interest in Real Property", Instrument No.
119382. The history of this matter indicates that a suit for quiet title was filed in December of
1988 relative to real property in Oneida County, Idaho which is attached to Instrument No.
119382 as Exhibit A. The matter having been litigated and an amended complaint having been
prepared and filed dealing with the foreclosure of the mortgage. A Motion for Summary

fi
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Judgment having come before the Court on or about September 1, 1992 wherein the Court
verbally ordered summary judgment for the plaintiffs, Petersens, and against defendants, El wood
and Lynn Nielsen. However, prior to the Court executing the written order, Nielsens filed a
bankruptcy in the State of Nevada, claiming to be residents of Nevada. That action was
ultimately dismissed in April of 1993. Whereafter, the Court in this matter executed the
Foreclosure Order foreclosing defendants' interest in the property and ordering that the property
be sold. This Court had previously ordered that the agreement, attached as Exhibit D to
Instrument No. 119382, was an unenforceable and voidable instrument and terminated the
operation of said contract.

However, in contravention of the Court's Order, defendants,

Nielsens, filed the "Notice of Interest in Real Property" on or about the 22nd day of July, 1993
and recorded the same in the Oneida County Real Estate Records. Document No. 119382 was
filed during the time of a pending appeal with the Idaho Supreme Court challenging the
Foreclosure Order. The "Notice of Interest in Real Property" appears to be an attempt to
disregard the Court's prior Order entered in Oneida County Case CV-88-7-874, relative to the
affect and operation of the Lease and Option to Purchase:
"This Agreement is in full, force and effect as of the date of this notice
together with the legal right of possession by the undersigned and together with
the right, title or interest granted thereto and said interest is to remain vested in
the undersigned or the heirs or assigns until exercise or expiration thereof.
Date this 1st day of July, 1993".
It would appear that the filing of the document is in contravention of the Court's
prior Orders and is an effort to place a cloud on the title following the Order of Foreclosure.
After lengthy negotiations and discussions among and between the parties, it
appears that settlement cannot be reached in this matter. However, in an attempt to purge
88-2012
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themselves of contempt, the defendants, Elwood L. Nielsen and Lynn Nielsen, indicated through
counsel that they would file a document terminating the affect and operation of Instrument No.
119382, Additionally, Fred J. Lewis, attorney for Nielsens indicated that he would contact the
trustee immediately to also obtain a release of the "Notice of Interest in Real Property". Thereby
waiving any and all interests, if any, that Lynn Nielsen's current bankruptcy estate may claim
under the terms of the "Notice of Interest in Real Property".
The second issue pending before the Court dealt with the allegations that Elwood
L. Nielsen entered upon the real property of the Petersens in contravention of the Court's Order
restraining such activity and removed certain items of property including a truck, a boat, a trailer
with four wheelers, and miscellaneous unknown and undisclosed property. Counsel for Petersens
indicated that he would reserve that contempt matter for the present time.
IT IS HEREBY THE ORDER OF THE COURT that the "Notice of Claim of
Interest" in the Petersen farm [Exhibit "A"l is void and of no force and effect.

Also, that

Nielsens terminate said "Notice" by retracting the "Notice". Nielsens are further ordered to
work with the trustee of Lynn Nielsen's bankruptcy in Utah to obtain appropriate releases of
claim of interest in this real property.
Counsel for Petersens also requested that costs and fees be awarded. It appears
clear from the record that the "Notice of Interest in Real Property" recordation is a contemptible
action and, therefore, costs and attorneys fees shall be awarded in the amount of %/y/
and for additional judgment against Elwood L. Nielsen.
DATED this Qr^ day of November, 1994.

William H. Woodland
Sixth District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SFRVTCF
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the m^-day of November, 1994, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document to the following parties, postage prepaid thereon,
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F. Randall Kline, Esq.
Attorney at Law
P. 0 . Box 397
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Express Mail
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Hand Delivery
Fax

Fred J. Lewis, Esq.
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 1391
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391

'U.S. Mail
Express Mail
Hand Delivery
Fax

Deputy Clerk
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EXHIBIT "E"

ORDER QUIETING TITLE, JUNE 14, 1996

E x h i b i t "D"

F. Randall Kline, Esquire
F. RANDALL KLINE, CHARTERED
427 N. Main St., Suite L
P.O. Box 397
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0397
Telephone: (208) 232-9007
Attorney for Piaintiffs/Counter-defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ONEIDA
REED L. PETERSEN and ETHEL
PETERSEN, husband and wife.
NORMAN L. PETERSEN and MAYME
PETERSEN, husband and wife,
LAVERN H. PETERSEN and LAVERN
PETERSEN, Executor of the
Estate of GEORGIA N.
PETERSEN, PERCY E. PETERSEN
and INEZ H. PETERSEN, husband
and wife.

CASE NO. 7-874

ORDER QUIETING TITLE

Piaintiffs/Counter-defendants,

vs.
EL WOOD L. NIELSEN and LYNN
NIELSEN, husband and wife,
LYNWOOD DEVELOPMENT CORP.
Utah corporation; and GRANT
THORNTON, Trustee of the
Bankruptcy Estate of Elwood
Leslie Nielsen and Lynn
Nielsen; DALE F. TUBBS and
KATHLEEN F. TUBBS, husband and
wife, VALLEY BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY, a banking corporation
of Utah.
Defendants,
ELWOOD L. NIELSEN and LYNN
NIELSEN, husband and wife.
Defendants/Counter-claimants.
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A Motion having been filed by the Plaintiffs, Reed Petersen and Ethel Petersen, husband
and wife, Norman L. Petersen and Mayme Petersen, husband and wife; LaVern H. Petersen,
individually and as executor of the estate of Georgia N. Petersen; and Percy E. Petersen and Inez
H. Petersen, husband and wife, (hereinafter jointly "Petersens"), in the above-entided action, the
Court makes the following findings:
1.

This action was commenced for abandonment and quiet tide in December 1988.

2.

A Decree foreclosing die mortgage and ordering sale came on for hearing on

August 31, 1992, the Order having been executed by the Court: on April 26, 1993.
3.

The Court is aware and is mindful that tiiere have been multiple appeals and

bankruptcies regarding the property, more particularly described in Exhibit "A", attached hereto
and incorporated herein.
4.

Based upon representadons, it appears that all ancillary matters have now been

completed or resolved.
5.

The property was sold at the Sheriffs Sale dated March 3, 1994. The time period

for statutory redemption has lapsed.

The Sheriffs Deed was issued March 6, 1995, as

Instrument No. 121399 in the Oneida County records.
6-

No other party has a claim or interest in the described property superior to that

of Petersens.
THEREFORE, based upon the record and upon the Motion, Supporting Affidavit, and
for good cause appearing;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

The property which is die subject matter of this litigation and controversy, more

particularly described in Exhibit "A\ is hereby quieted in Reed Petersen and Ethel Petersen,
/-ACT:

\in

7_S7A
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husband and wife, Norman L. Petersen and Mayme Petersen, husband and wife; LaVcrn H.
Petersen, individually and as executor of the estate of Georgia N. Petersen; and Percy E.
Petersen and Inez H. Petersen, husband and wife, free and clear of any and all claims.
2.

The Petersens have full right, tide, and interest in said described property.

DATED this Jf^day of June, 1996.

A-»v4

/William H. Woodland
Sixth District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the \<& day of June, 1996, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to the following parties, postage prepaid thereon, in die manner
indicated below:
Brent T. Robinson
LING, NIELSEN & ROBINSON
P. 0. Box 396
Rupert, Idaho 83350
F. Randall Kline, Esq.
F. RANDALL KLINE, CHARTERED
P. 0. Box 397
Pocateilo, Idaho 83204-0397

U.S. Mail
Express Mail
Hand Delivery
Fax

1}.S. Mail
Express Mail
Hand Delivery
Fax

^Vy^-QUna-fr
*rr Clerk
Deputy
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EXHIBIT "A"

TRACT 1:
Township 15 South, Range 33 East, Boise Meridian:
Section 36: NV4; SEW; EV4SWK
Township 16 South, Range 33 East, Boise Meridian:
Section I: ALL
Township 15 South, Range 34 East, Boise Meridian:
Section 31: Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4; NEKSWK
TRACT 2:
Township 15 South, Range 33 East, Boise Meridian:
Section 36: WV4SWW
Township 16 South, Range 34 East, Boise Meridian:
Section 6: N'A
TRACT 3:
Township 15 South, Range 34 East, Boise Meridian:
Section 29: NV&SWW; SWWSWK
Section 30: SEW; SEKSWW; SEKNEW; Lot 4
TRACT 4:
Township 15 South, Range 34 East, Boise Meridian:
Section 31: NE%; EV&SEW; E'ANWW; NWV4SEK
TRACT 5:
Township 15 South, Range 34 East, Boise Meridian:
Section 31: SW'4SelA; SE V4SW%
Together widi and including all grazing rights, permits,
and allotments appurtenant to die real property

CASE NO. 7-874

ORDER QUIETING TITLE

EXHIBIT "F"

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR DISMISSAL OF APPEAL, NOVEMBER 1, 1996

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
REED L. PETERSEN, et al,

)
)
Plaintiffs-Counter)
Defendants-Respondents, )
)
v.
)
)
ELWCOD L. NIELSEN and LYNN NIELSEN,)
husband and wife,
)
Defendants-CounterClaimants-Appellants,
and

ORDER GRANTING MOTION
FOR DISMISSAL OF APPEAL
NO. 23178
Ref. No- 965-304

)
)
)

LYNWOOD DEVELOPMENT CORP., et al, )
Defendants.

)

A MOTION FOR DISMISSAL OF APPEAL with supporting
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL with attachments and BRIEF was filed byRespondents October 3, 1996. An OBJECTION TO RESPONDENTSf MOTION
TO DISMISS APPEAL
with attachments was
filed by Appellants
October 21, 1996. The Court is fully advised; therefore, after d'sie
consideration
IT' HEREBY IS ORDERED that the MOTION FOR DISMISSAL OF'
APPEAL be, and hereby is, GRANTED and this appeal is DISMISSED
based upon the parties1 stipulation filed in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, Nc.
94B-22877, Chapter 7, in Re: Lynn Nielsen, debtor.
DATED this J

cc:

day of November, 1996.

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Judge W. H. Woodland
Reporter L. Larson
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EXHIBIT "G"

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER, APRIL 22, 1999

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ONEIDA
Case No. CV-97-566
REED L. PETERSEN INVESTMENT
COMPANY, a .Utah Partnership,
ETHEL PETERSEN, general
partner, CURTIS PETERSEN,
ROBERT PETERSEN, DIXIE
JACKSON, Limited Partners;
NORMAN L. PETERSEN (deceased)
and MAYME PETERSEN, and their
successors in interest
BETTY RUSSELL and LOUISE
HARBINSON, LAVERN H.
PETERSEN and PERCY E.
PETERSEN,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

-vs-

)

ELWOOD L. NIELSEN and F.
STANLEY NIELSEN,

)
)

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

)

Oneida County Case No. CV-97-56c
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
Page 1

134

On April 5, 1999, the Court took motions under advisement in
this case.

Now it issues its decision in this case.

The Court

GRANTS the Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to
the slander of title "claim, the declaratory judgment claims, the
prayer for an order to strike, etc., and the injunctive relief;
GRANTS summary judgment to the Defendants as to the Quiet Title
Action; and GRANTS summary judgment to the Plaintiffs as to the
Counterclaim.

All contrary motions are also DENIED.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allows that
summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions' and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Smith

v. Meridian

Joint

School

Dist.

No. 2, 128

Idaho 714, 718, 918 P.2d 583, 587 (1996) (quoting I.R.C.P.
56(c)); see

also

of Coeur d'Alene,
Wahlquist,

Idaho

Building

Contractors

Association

v.

126 Idaho 740, 890 P.2d 326 (1995); Avila

126 Idaho 745, 890 P.2d 331 (1995).

City
v.

In making this

determination, a Court should liberally construe the record in
favor of the party opposing the motion and draw all reasonable
inferences and conclusions in that party' s'favor.
Idaho at 718, 918 P.2d at 587 (citing Friel

v. Boise

Smith,
City

128
Hous.

Oneida County Case No. CV-97-566
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Auth.r

126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994)).

If

reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw
conflicting inferences from the evidence, summary judgment must
be denied.

Id.

(citing Harris

v. Department

~of Health

123 Idaho 295, 298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992)).

&

Welfare,

However, if the

evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then
summary judgment should be granted.
918 P. 2d at 587-88 (citing Loomis

Id.,

128 Idaho at 718-719,

v. City

of Haileyr

119 Idaho

434, 437, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991)).
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact rests at all times with the party moving for
summary judgment.
Tlngley

v.

Id.,

Harrison,

128 Idaho at 719, 918 P. 2d at 588 (citing

125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994)).

In order to meet its burden, the moving party must challenge in
its motion and establish through evidence the absence of any
genuine issue of material fact on an element of the nonmoving
party's case.

Id.

(citing Thomson v. Idaho

Ins.

126 Idaho 527, 530, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037 (1994)).

Agency,

Inc.,

If the moving

party fails to challenge an element or fails to present evidence
establishing the absence of genuine issue of material fact on
that element, the burden does not shift to the nonmoving party,
and the nonmoving party is not required to'respond with
supporting evidence.

Id.

(citing Thomson,

126 Idaho at 530, 887

Oneida County Case No. CV-97-566
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P.2d at 1038)). However, if the moving party cnallenges an
element of the nonmoving party's case on the basis that no
genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to
the nonmoving party to come forward with sufficient evidence to
Id.

create a genuine issue of fact.

(citing Tingley,

125 Idaho

at 90, 867 P.2d at 964). Summary judgment is properly granted in
favor of the moving party, when the nonmoving party fails to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case upon which that party bears the burden of proof at trial.
Id.

(citing Thomson,

Badell

v.

Beeks,

126 Idaho at 530-31, 887 P.2d at 1037-38;

115. Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126 (1988)).

The

party opposing the summary judgment motion "may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the
party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial."

Id.

(quoting I.R.C.P. 56(e)). .The

nonmoving party's case must be anchored in something more than
speculation, and a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to
create a genuine issue of fact.
Inc.,

Tuttle

v. Sudenga

Industries,

125 Idaho 145, 868 P.2d 473 (1994)) (plaintiff who produces

mere scintilla of evidence, or otherwise raises only slight doubt
as to facts, will not withstand summary judgment); Nelson
Steer,

118 Idaho 409, 797 P.2d 117 (1990).

v.

If the nonmoving

Oneida County Case No. CV-97-566
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party does not come forward as provided in the rule, then summary
judgment should be entered against that party. State
Resources

Ltd.

Partnership,

v. Shama

127 Idaho 267, 270, 899 P.2d 977, 980

(1995) .
Although both parties in the instant case have moved for
summary judgment, it does not in and of itself establish that
there is no genuine issue of fact.
(Mut)

r

Kromrei

v. Aid Ins.

Co.

110 Idaho 549, 551, 716 P.2d 1321, 1323 (1986); Casey

Highlands
(1979) .

Ins.

Co.,

v.

100 Idaho 505, 507, 600 P.2d 1387, 1389

However, where all the parties file motions for summary

judgment relying on the same facts, issues, and theories, the
parties essentially stipulate that there is no genuine issue of
material fact which would preclude the district court from
entering summary judgment.

Brown v. Perkins,

129 Idaho 189, 191,

923 P.2d 434, 436 (1996); Morrissey

v. Haley,

865 P.2d 961, 963 (1993); Riverside

Dev. Co. v. Ritchie,

124 Idaho 870, 872,
103

Idaho 515, 518-19, 650 P.2d 657, 660-61 (1982).
Where one party to an action has moved for summary judgment,
summary judgment may be granted to a nonmoving party, if there
are; no genuine issues of material fact and if the nonmoving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Ins.

Co. of

Idaho,

(citing Spencer-Steed

Miner v.

Farmers

116 Idaho 656, 659, 778 P.2d 778, 781 (1989)
v. Spencer,

115 Ldaho 338, 345, 766 P. 2d
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1219, 1226 (1988); Juker

v.

American

Livestock

Ins.

Co.,

102

Idaho 644, 645, 637 P.2d 792, 793 (1981)).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Court adopts the facts outlined in the December 9, 1998
Memorandum Decision and Order in making this decision, except as
outlined below:
Amended Fact 2:
On February 24, 1983, the Tubbs assigned
their rights in the Petersen Farm to Lynn and Elwood. Lynn and
Elwood did not pay Petersen as mandated by the contract. In
February, 1986, Lynn and Elwood filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
in Utah.
Amended Fact 3:
During the pendency of the Chapter 11
bankruptcy, Petersen and Lynn and Elwood entered into an
agreement (hereinafter referred to as the 'Mease/option
agreement"), wherein .title to the Petersen Farm would be restored
to Petersen, and Lynn and Elwood would have a ten year lease with
an option to purchase. The lease/option agreement was dependent
upon the approval of the bankruptcy trustee, who thereafter
approved the lease/option agreement. However, Lynn and Elwood
thereafter converted their bankruptcy from Chapter 11 to Chapter
7 in January, 1988.
Amended Fact 4:
Upon conversion to the Chapter 7
bankruptcy, the Petersen Farm was abandoned from the bankruptcy
at Petersen's request. Petersen was also granted relief from the
Chapter 7 automatic stay and was allowed to pursue their remedy
outside of bankruptcy.
Amended Fact 5:

In 1991, the Court held, in Case No. 7-

874:
The conversion of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy to
Chapter 7 voided the trustee's prior approval of the
lease....
A trial court has the discretion to determine
whether a contract is ambiguous or not. A contract
which is not ambiguous is construed by the trial court
as a matter of law. As stated in Haener v. Ada County
Highway District, 108 Idaho 170, 173, 697 P.2d 1185
(1985), "the interpretation of the written contract and
Oneida County Case No. CV-97-566
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of the intent of the parties is a matter for the trial
judge's discretion."
This Court finds that the "lease agreement" is not
ambiguous. Therefore, this court may interpret as a
matter of law the meaning of that contract. The above
quoted disclaimer clearly outlines the parties' intent
to void the "lease agreement" if the bankruptcy court
does not agree to the lease. Although the necessary
approval was, initially, granted, the approval was
voidable. When the bankruptcy estate was converted
from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the approval
of the court was voided. Thus, without the approval of
the bankruptcy court, by its provisions the "lease
agreement" is void.
Thus, in the absence of the lease agreement, the
governing agreement must be the written assignment
which incorporates the original Petersen-Tubbs
agreement.
The Court also finds the following additional facts to be the
relevant facts in determining these motions.
22.

The Petersen Farm was released from the Chapter 11

bankruptcy in October, 1986.

The lease/option agreement was

never assumed by the trustee, either in Chapter 11 or in Chapter
7 bankruptcy.
23.

The Defendants sent the Court a March 1, 1999 letter

consenting to the Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint.

On March

5, 1999, Stanley Nielsen Answered the Second Amended Complaint
and filed a Counterclaim against the Plaintiffs.

Oneida County Case No. CV-97-566
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DISCUSSION
I.

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
A. Slander of Title

In order to maintain a cause of action for slander of title,
the claimant has the burden of showing: (1) uttering or
publishing of slanderous statements; (2) when the statements were
false; (3) with malice; and (4) resulting in special damages.
Baker

v.

Boren,

129 Idaho 885, 897, 934 P.2d 951, 963 (Ct. App.

1997) (citing Matheson

v. Harris,

861, 863-64 (1997); Sun Valley

98 Idaho 758, 760-761, 572 P.2d

Land and Minerals,

Inc.

v.

Burt,

123 Idaho 862, 869, 853 P.2d 607, 614 (Ct. App. 1993).
The Court has already addressed this issue as to Stanley
Nielsen in, its December 9, 1998 Memorandum Decision and Order.
There is no additional evidence now presented to the Court to
change that decision as to Stanley Nielsen.

Therefore, the

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to slander of title must
be granted as to Defendant, Stanley Nielsen.
The Court also addressed slander of title in its December 9,
1998 Memorandum Decision and Order as to Defendant, Elwood L.
Nielsen.

There, the Court denied summary judgment to Elwood

Nielsen as to slander of title.

However, the Court now GRANTS

this Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings regarding slander of
title as to Elwood Nielsen, because no special damages have been
Oneida County Case No, CV-97-566
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shown by the Plaintiffs.

Except as to special damages, the Court

adopts the December 9, 1998 Memorandum Decision and Order as to
the other three elements of slander of title by Elwood L.
Nielsen.
In Rayl

v. Shull

Enterprises,

Inc.,

108 Idaho 524, 530, 700

P.2d 567, 573 (1985), the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the proof
of special damages.

There, the court held that (1) the expenses

of legal proceedings (including attorney fees) necessary to
remove a cloud on the plaintiff's title or other expenses to
counteract the disparagement and/or (2) the loss of a particular
pending sale could all be special damages in a slander of title
action.
There are no losses of pending sales of real property
alleged in the Second Amended Complaint for Slander of Title, nor
were there any alleged in the first complaints filed herein. The
issue has always been whether the attorney fees being billed to
the Plaintiffs by Mr. Kline for maintaining this action could be
those special damages.
In Rayl v. Shull Enterprisesr

Inc.,

108 Idaho at 525, 700

P.2d at 568, the plaintiff brought a quiet title claim (seeking
to remove a labor lien) and a slander of title claim in the same
action.

The Idaho Supreme Court allowed the plaintiff to use the

attorney fees he had paid to bring the quiet title claim as
Oneida County Case No. CV-97-566
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special damages in the slander of title claim.

Based en that

decision, this Court has continually questioned Plaintiffs
counsel concerning whether they were maintaining quiet title
actions.and/or declaratory judgment actions in this case (because
the attorney fees for maintaining one or both of those actions
would be the special damages the Plaintiffs would be required to
prove).

Until the filing of the Second Amended Complaint, Mr.

Kline has always stipulated that this action was not brought to
quiet title in the property (even as to Stanley Nielsen).

In his

briefs opposing Mr. Nielsen's Motion for Reconsideration of the
December 9, 1998 Memorandum Decision and Order, Mr. Kline also
stipulated that these actions were not brought to seek a
declaratory judgment.

Not until the Second Amended Complaint did

the Plaintiffs allege a claim to quiet the title in this property
and/or a claim for a declaratory judgment.

Therefore, there have

been no damages which have been incurred as special damages until
the Plaintiffs1 pursuit of that Second Amended Complaint.
The quiet title claim and the declaratory judgment claim in
that Second Amended Complaint have been dismissed by this
decision.

There are therefore no special damages to be alleged

and proven in a slander of title claim.

Having failed to prove

the final element of a slander of title claim, it must also be
dismissed as to Elwood L. Nielsen.
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3. Other claims.
The Plaintiffs request that the Court determine that (1) tne
option is of no force and effect, void and unenforceable; (2)
strike tjie assignment from the records of Bannock County; and (3)
issue an injunction to prevent further clouding of the title by
the Defendants and/or either of them.
The validity of the option agreement is determined in the
part of this decision relating to the counterclaim for breach of
contract, so it will not be addressed here.

Where there is a

pending action which involves the identical issues raised in a
declaratory judgment action, it is proper for the district court
to dismiss the request for declaratory relief.
Agricultural

Products

Corp.,

Scott

v.

102 Idaho 147, 627 P.2d 326 (1981).

The Court finds no authority for the request for an order to
strike, invalidate, remove, and terminate the assignment of the
option from the Oneida County real estate records.
therefore will not grant such request.

The Court

The Court however holds

that a recorded decision eliminating an option (which was
previously recorded) accomplishes the same result.
The decision whether to grant an injunction is committed to
the sound discretion of the trial court.
Sav.

& Loan Assn.,

(1987);

Milbert

O'Boskey

v. First

Fed.

112 Idaho 1002, 1007, 739 P.2d 301, 306
v. Carl Carbon,

Inc.,

89 Idaho 471, 479, 406

Oneida County Case No. CV-97-566
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?.2d 113, 115 (1965).

An injunction can only issue to restrain

the commission of a future or contemplated action, and the writ
will not be granted to restrain an act which has already
occurred.
Wilson

v.

Roberts v. Kartzke,
City

of Boise

City,

18 Idaho 552, 111 P. 1 (1910);
7 Idaho 69, 60 P. 84 (1900).

Injunctions should issue only where irreparable injury is
actually threatened, where conduct causing that injury has been
discontinued, the injunction should be denied.

However, the

trial court must be convinced by the defendant that there is no
reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.
v.

First

Federal

Sav.

1007, 739 P.2d at 306.

& Loan Association

of Boise,

O'Boskey

112 Idaho at

The Court finds that this action (claims

and counterclaims) will end the dispute between these parties.
The decision regarding the validity or invalidity of the option
will end this dispute.

Therefore, an injunction is not

appropriate.
At the April 5, 1999 hearing, the Defendants withdrew the
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the Quiet Title
Action.
II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - QUIET TITLE ACTION
Precisely because a claim of title is a general claim of
ownership of the property, a complaint to quiet title is
sufficient if it alleges, in ordinary and concise terms, that the
Oneida County Case No. CV-97-566
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plaintiff is the owner of the disputed property, without setting
forth the probative facts by which that ultimate fact is to be
Aldape

established.

v. Akins,

105 Idaho 254, 260, 668 P.2d 130,

136 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing Hammit v.

Idaho 245, 181 P. 336 (1919)).

Virginia

Mining

"Co., 32

Although a quiet title action

challenges the title of an adversary, the plaintiff necessarily
asserts his own estate in bringing a quiet title action.
Id.(citing Dickerson
(1965)).

v. Brewster, 88 Idaho 330, 399 P.2d 407

Thus, in an action to quiet title the plaintiff must

establish the validity of his or her own title.

It is not

sufficient merely to expose a potential weakness of someone
else's title to the same property.

Bell

v.

Golden

Condor,

117 Idaho 21, 23, 784 P.2d 351, 353 (Ct. App. 1989)(citing
v.
also

Walkinshaw,
Aldapef

Pocatello

Inc.,
Currie

113 Idaho 586, 746 P.2d 1045 (Ct. App. 1987)); see
105 Idaho at 260, 668 P.2d at 136 (citing Pincock

Gold

& Copper

Mining

Co.r

v.

100 Idaho 325, 597 P. 2d 211

(1979)) .
There is no evidence here that these Plaintiffs are the
owners of the Petersen Farm.

The Plaintiffs allege (in the

Second Amended Complaint, without verification) that they are
"the owners in fee simple of the property described in Exhibit
1."

However, that allegation was denied by the Defendants in

their Answer and Counterclaim.

Joan Williams prepared a title
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commitment for property owned by Reed L. Petersen, Norman L.
Petersen, Percy E. Petersen, and LaVern H. Petersen (allegedly
this same property) at the request of Curt Petersen.

This Court

cannot allow these plaintiffs to quiet title in this property to
themselves, when there is no evidence that they own the propertyIll. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - COUNTERCLAIM
A.
The Defendant, Stanley Nielsen, also moves for summary
judgment as to. his breach of contract claim against the
Plaintiffs.

The Court instead grants summary judgment to the

Plaintiffs, because there is no option agreement to breach.
Generally, a lessee suing for damages for breach of an option to
purchase leased land must establish that the lease containing the
option was in full force and effect at the time he attempted to
exercise the option.
previously terminated

The lease and the option had been
in Case No. 7-874.

In 1975, Reed and Ethel Petersen, Norman and Myme Petersen,
LaVern Petersen and the estate of Georgia Petersen, and Percy and
Inez Petersen (hereinafter Petersens) sold the Petersen Farm to
Dale and Kathleen Tubbs (hereinafter Tubbs) pursuant to a
contract of sale.

In 1983, Elwood and Lynn Nielsen (hereinafter

Nielsens) were assigned the Tubbsf interest in the contract in
order to continue to purchase the property from Petersens.

In
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February 1986, Nielsens filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.

Pursuant

to an August 6, 1986 agreement between the Nielsens and the
Petersens, the Petersen Farm was released from the Chapter 11
bankruptcy-

In that agreement, the parties agreed that:

1.
Petersens would receive ten years of payments from
the Conservation Reserve Program (hereinafter CRP);
2.
Nielsens would lease the house, outbuildings, the
land on which the house and outbuildings were located,
and all other land (not in the CRP) for the same ten
years;
3.
Petersens. would pay the taxes on the property (for
years after 1986). Nielsens would maintain the
buildings and fences and would insure the house;
4.
Nielsens would get the proceeds of the 1986 crop,
pay the 1986 and prior years1 property taxes;
5.
Nielsens would plant the CRP property into
appropriate CRP crop (at the expense of the Petersens);
6.
Petersens would grant the Nielsens an option to
purchase the property at the end of the ten years
lease. Both parties agreed to sign and put the
appropriate documents in escrow to effect this
agreement.
However, Nielsens never could put the Chapter 11 reorganization
plan together.

Therefore, they were forced into a Chapter 7

liquidation plan.

The Court (in Case No. 7-874 in August, 1991)

therefore found that the August 6, 198 6 Agreement was void,
because Nielsens could not proceed in the Chapter 11 plan as
contemplated in the agreement.

He then returned the parties to

their pre-agreement position, as if (1) an agreement had never

Oneida County Case No. CV-97-566
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been formulated and (2) the Petersen Farm had never been a part
of the bankruptcy.

This Court finds that August, 1991 Order

terminated not only the lease, but also the option Mr. Nielsen
now seeks to enforce.
Mr. Nielsen first argues that the Court never discussed the
option in its August 26, 1991 Memorandum Decision and Order,
therefore it only intended to eliminate the lease and leave the
option viable.

The Court disagrees.

There is no evidence in

this record that the Court intended for Nielsens to have any
further interest in this property (including the right to
purchase it pursuant to the language of the option).

Both

parties were allowed^to amend their pleadings after the August,
1991 decision.

Petersens were allowed to amend to assert a

breach of contract action (for failure to pay pursuant to the
terms and conditions of the land sale contract).

Nielsens

amended their complaint and counterclaim to assert (1) that the
Court erred in terminating the lease and the option in the
agreement, and (2) the Court should allow them redemption rights.
The Court granted summary judgment to the Petersens on September
1, 1992, however forcing them to foreclose on the property in
judicial foreclosure (which allowed Nielsens credit for the CRP
payments and redemption rights).

After invalid attempts at

bankruptcy by Nielsens in other states, the Court entered a

Oneida County Case No. CV-97-566
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written foreclosure order on April 27, 1993.

On May 27, 1993,

Nielsens attempted to stay the sale of the property while they
could appeal his decision.

The Court denied the request.

When

the Nielsens filed a Notice of Interest in Real Property in
Oneida County on July 22, 1993, the Court found such recordation
to be "a contemptible action" in its November 9, 1994 Order Re:
Contempt and awarded costs and fees to the Petersens for fighting
such a filing.
Further, it is the general rule that termination of a lease
of property containing an option to purchase previous to the
expiration of the term also terminates the option, if the lease
is construable as entire and indivisible, and the option and
Moore

other provisions of the lease are interdependent.
Northwest

Fabricators,

(1957); Gershenhom

Inc.,
v. Walter

v.

51 Wash 2d 26, 28, 314 P.2d 941, 943
R. Stutz

Enterprises,

72 Nevada

293, 298, 304 P.2d 395, 400 (1956) reh den 72 Nevada 312, 306
P.2d 121, cert den 354 U.S. 926, 1 L.Ed 2d 1437, 77 S.Ct. '1382
reh den

(Nev.) 306 P.2d 121; See also

Krepcik

v.

Tippett,

Idaho 696, 701, 710 P.2d 606, 711 (Ct. App. 1985).

109

This lease

was terminated prior to the expiration of the lease term.

The

option and the other provisions of the August 6, 1986 Agreement
are interdependent.

The lease and the option are indivisible.

The CRP payments are payments for the lease and for the option.
Oneida County Case No. CV-97-566
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There is no evidence that Nielsens paid any different
consideration for the leased property in the agreement than for
the option.

This lease/option agreement was a package to rectify

a problem which existed at the time of its making.

There is no

evidence that it was ever intended to be divisible.

Therefore,

this Court finds that the termination of the lease agreement also
terminated the option (whether or not expressed by the Court in
its August 16, 1991 decision).
Mr. Nielsen next argues that the Court was wrong in its
August 26, 1991 decision in Case No. 7-874.

Whether the Court

was wrong or right, an appeal is the proper challenge to that
action not a counterclaim in a separate proceeding.

Failure to

appeal fixes the rights of the parties so far as they are
determined by such judgment.
256 P. 368, 370 (1927).

Briggs

v. Mason,

44 Idaho 283, 285,

Nielsens did appeal the Court's decision

three different times; all of which appeals were denied.

The

doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents the relitigation of
issues actually litigated and decided in a prior case.
v.

City

of Pocatello,

Anderson

112 Idaho 176, 183, 731 P.2d 171, 178

(1986) . The appropriate test for when collateral estoppel should
apply includes the following:
(1) Did the party "against whom the earlier decision is
asserted ... have a 'full and fair opportunity to
litigate that issue in the earlier case?'" (2) Was the
issue decided in the prior litigation "identical with
Oneida County Case No. CV-97-566
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the one presented in the action in question?" (3) Was
the issue actually decided in the prior litigation?
This may be dependent on whether deciding -the issue was
"necessary to [the prior] judgment." (4) "Was there a
final judgment on the merits?" (5) "Was the party
against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity
with a party to the prior adjudication?"
Anderson,

112 Idaho at 183-84, 731 P.2d at 178-79 (citations

omitted).

In Case No. 7-784, the Nielsens had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue of the intent of their August
6, 198 6 Agreement and the resulting consequences to the agreement
of failing to reorganize in Chapter 11 bankruptcy (as
contemplated by the parties when making the agreement) . They
were represented by L. Charles Johnson III and fought the
Petersens regarding the intent of the August 6, 1986 agreement
throughout the proceedings prior to the August 26, 1991 decision.
The resulting consequences to the agreement of failing to
reorganize under Chapter 11 bankruptcy is the exact same issue
here presented.

Though the Court, in Case No. 7-874, never

actually said that option was terminated, the fact that the
agreement was terminated was decided in that case.

With the

lease agreement terminated, then the option was terminated
because the lease and the option were interdependent in the
agreement.

There was a final judgment on the. merits. Mr.

Oneida County Case No. CV-97-566
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Stanley Nielsen is in privity with the Nielsens, the defendants
in the prior adjudication.

Relitigation of the issue regarding

the effects of failing to reorganize may therefore not be
accomplished by filing a counterclaim here.
Mr. Nielsen then attempts to fortify his arguments about a
faulty Court judgment, in Case No. 7-874, by arguing that (1) the
Court wrongly allowed the Petersens to foreclose on the property
as a mortgage while the agreement between the Nielsens and the
Petersens was a land sales contract and (2) the Nielsens were
never given any consideration for the CRP payments collected by
Petersens after the foreclosure.

Again, these issues are

eliminated by the doctrine of res judicata.

They were issues in

Case No. 7-874 and need not be reconsidered here.

Further,

courts have long found that a judicial foreclosure sale of real
property (even in situations with land sale installment
contracts) is "always an available remedy to a trial court and
may well be the most equitable remedy."
Holdings,

Ltd.,

Rickel

v. Energy

Systems

114 Idaho 585, 587, 759 P.2d 876, 878 (1988). The

Court allocated the CRP payments made prior to the foreclosure to
the benefit of the Nielsens in determining the amount owed by
Nielsens to Petersens on the property; then the property was
given to a receiver to sell the property at a sheriff's sale.
The Nielsens also received the benefit from the future CRP
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payments, as (1) if the buyer at the sheriff's sale paid more
than was owed against the property, such excess would have been
returned to the Nielsens, and (2) the future guaranteed CRP
payments increased the likelihood that more would be bid at the
sheriff's sale by a potential buyer.

The doctrine of res

judicata prevents the relitigation of matters which have
proceeded to a final conclusion between the parties to the
litigation or their privies.

Andre v. Morrow,

106 Idaho 455,

458, 680 P.2d 1355, 1358 (1984); Shea v. Bader,
638 P.2d 894 (1981);

Idaho

State

University

Idaho 724, 552 P.2d.776 (1976); Gaige v. City

102 Idaho 697,

v.

Mitchell,

of Boiser

97

91 Idaho

481, 425 P'.2d 52 (1967) .
Mr. Nielsen next collaterally attacks the judgment in Case
No. 7-874, arguing that the Court had no jurisdiction to issue
that judgment.

The issue (decided by the Court in Case No. 7-87 4

on August 26, 1991) was the effect of the failure to reorganize
under Chapter 11 bankruptcy on the August 6, 198 6 Agreement.

The

issue was decided by determining the intent of the parties in
making that agreement.

There is no authority for the position

that an Idaho district court had no authority to make that
decision.

Further, the property had been abandoned from the

bankruptcy estate and the Petersens had been given relief from
the automatic stay in bankruptcy to "pursue all of their legal
Oneida County Case No. CV-97-566
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and contractual remedies" against such property.

Only in Case

No. 7-974 was there a venue to pursue such remedies.

A court's

final judgments, whether right or wrong, are not subject to
collateral attack if they have jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action.

Sierra

Life

Ins.

Co. v. Granada,

99 Idaho

624, 626, 586 P.2d 1068, 1070 (1978).
Mr. Nielsen also argues that a jury ought to interpret the
August 26, 1991 decision in Case No. 7-874 and determine whether
the Court eliminated the option with the lease.
absolutely no authority for that position.

The Court finds

It has always been a

courtfs duty to construe a judgment so as to give it effect and
validity, making its interpretation in harmony with the facts and
the law of the case.

Evans

v. City

of American

7, 20, 11 P.2d 363, 376 (1932); Follett

v.

Idaho 416, 425, 294 P.2d 1088, 1097 (1956).

Taylor

Falls,

52 Idaho

Brothers, 77

When hearing an

action to enforce a judgment and finding the judgment ambiguous,
a court may even refer to the circumstances surrounding the
making of the judgment in attempting to interpret it.

Lester v.

Lester, 104 Idaho 244, 245, 658 P.2d 915, 916 (1983) (citations
omitted).
B.
Mr. Nielsen finally argues that the Plaintiffs (in order to
allege jurisdiction over Mr. Nielsen) took the legal position
Oneida County Case No. CV-97-566
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that the option was accepted and became a contract before the
option ceased to be effective.

Therefore Nielsens argue that the

doctrine of judicial estoppel should prevent the Plaintiffs from
talcing a contrary position regarding the validity of the option.
Reading the Plaintiffs' briefs, the Court does not find that to
be the Plaintiffs' legal position at all.
In McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 152, 937 P.2d 1222, 1226
(1997), the Idaho Supreme Court adopted of the language of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (in Rissetto v. Plumbers
Steamfitters

Local

343,

and

94 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir.1996)) in

stating the doctrine of judicial estoppel.

It said:

Judicial estoppel, sometimes also known as the doctrine
of preclusion of inconsistent positions, precludes a
party from gaining an advantage by taking one position,
and then seeking a second advantage by taking an
incompatible position ...
In Robertson

Supply

Inc.

v. Nicholls,

131 Idaho 99, 101, 952 P. 2d

914, 916 (Ct. App. 1998), the Idaho Court of Appeal explained,
"this doctrine prevents a party from assuming a position in one
proceeding and then taking an inconsistent position in a
subsequent proceeding."

That did not happen here.

The

Plaintiffs have argued that Mr. Nielsen's position regarding the
option and breach of contract could not be plead, without also
making him subject to the jurisdiction of this Court.

They have

however never agreed that the option was valid at the time it was
Oneida County Case No. CV-97-566
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allegedly exercised.

The Court does not see those as

inconsistent positions.
The fact that counsel for Mr. Nielsen read the Plaintiffs1
argument in their briefs and then agreed to personal jurisdiction
over Mr. Nielsen herein (thereafter filing a counterclaim) did
not commit this Court to the same decision.

However when Mr.

Nielsen filed a counterclaim, which was thereafter answered by
the Plaintiffs, he submitted himself to the jurisdiction of this
Court.

Cage v. Harris,

119 Idaho 451, 807 P.2d 1289 (Ct. App.

1991) .
IV.

OTHER MOTIONS

The Nielsens have moved to strike Paragraphs 3 and 4 from
the Affidavit of Joan Williams.

The Court did not rely on either

paragraph 3 or 4 of such affidavit in making this decision.
Therefore, the Court finds a decision as to that motion to be
moot and does not grant the motion.
Also before the Court was the Memorandum of Costs as to Lynn
Nielsen's judgment.

Since the Court has determined the other

remaining issues (in this action) in this Memorandum Decision and
Order, the Court will rule on costs and attorney fees as to all
parties and all claims at one time.

The Court will await further

Memorandums of Costs and/or Objections to the same prior to
issuing a decision as to any costs and fees.

The Court will
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therefore take the decision as to the awarding of the costs and
fees regarding Lynn Nielsenfs judgment under advisement at that
same time.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED April 22, 1999.

Copies to:
F. Randall Kline
Daniel L. Hawkley
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EXHIBIT "H"
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER, MAY 24,1999
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ONEIDA
Case No. CV-97-566
REED L. PETERSEN INVESTMENT
COMPANY, a Utah Partnership,
ETHEL PETERSEN, general
partner, CURTIS PETERSEN,
ROBERT PETERSEN, DIXIE
JACKSON, Limitad Partners;
NORMAN L. PETERSEN (deceased)
and MAYME PETERSEN, and their
successors in interest
BETTY RUSSELL and LOUISE
HARBINSON, LAVERN H.
PETERSEN and PERCY E.
PETERSEN,
Plaintiffs,
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER

-vsELWOOD L. NIELSEN and F.
STANLEY NIELSEN,
Defendants.
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This matter again comes before the Court on May 24, 19S9 for
determination of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Defendant,
F. Stanley Nielsen, the Motion Requesting the Honorable N. Randy
Smith to Consider Recusal filed by both Defendants, the Motion for
Court to Take Judicial Notice filed by Defendant, F. Stanley
Nielsen, and the Memorandums of Costs filed by both Defendants and
the Plaintiffs. Appearing for the Plaintiffs at the hearing was F.
Randall Kline. Appearing for the Defendants was Daniel L. Hawkley.
Prior to the hearing, the Court received and reviewed the
motions and memorandums of costs, the Memorandum in Support of
Nielsen's

Motion

for

Reconsideration,

the

Objection

to

the

Memorandum of Costs" for Elwood Nielsen, the Objection to the
Memorandum of Costs for F. Stanley Nielsen, the Objection to
Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs, and the two Responses to the
Objections to Costs for the Defendants.
At the hearing, the Court heard the respective arguments of
counsel and RULED as follows:
1.

The Court DENIES the Motion Requesting the Honorable N.

Randy Smith to Consider Recusal;
The Court explained its decision as to the Motion Requesting
Recusal on the record.

Such motion must be brought pursuant to

Rule 40(d) (2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
grounds enumerated in the rule apply here.

None of the

It was not a motion to
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disqualify, rather a motion to consider recusal.

No affidavit of

the party or the party's attorney was filed with the motion.
When this judge took over this case in February, 1998, he
reviewed the prior filings herein, the Complaint for Slander of
Title, the Motion to Dismiss F. Stanley Nielsen, the Motion to
Disqualify Honorable Don Harding, the Amended Motion of F. Stanley
Nielsen to Set Aside Default and Motion to Set Aside Decree
Foreclosing Mortgage and Ordering Sale in Oneida County Case No, 7874, the Motion for Protective Order, the Motion to Disqualify F.
Randall Kline as Attorney, the Plaintiffs' Response to the Amended
Motion and Motion to Set Aside, the Amended Moticn to Dismiss
Complaint, and the January 12, 1998 Memorandum Decision and Order.
Since F. Stanley Nielsen's own Amended Motion to Set Aside Default
and Motion to Set Aside Decree Foreclosing Mortgage and Ordering
Sale in Oneida County Case No. 7-874 (1) reference that Judge
Harding had taken judicial notice of the entire Oneida Case No. 7874 file and (2) cannot be adjudicated without reviewing the file,
the Court asked for the file and reviewed it to find the decree
foreclosing mortgage and ordering sale and those orders included
therein.

However, the Court's decisions in this case are made on

the facts as outlined in its decisions and none ether.
section

9-101

Idaho Code

further outlines these facts which a court may

judicially notice.
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The Court's reasoning in its prior decisions is in the record.
The fact that the Defendants do not like such reasoning does not
make the Court biased or prejudiced against them.

They m

fact

prevailed on the Second Amended Complaint.
The Court did not refuse to let this case end prior to being
asked to rule on the summary judgment motion on the breach of
contract

counterclaim.

voluntarily

Mr. Hawkley made that decision.

He

submitted his client to the jurisdiction of this Court

and filed the counterclaim, which was answered by the Plaintiffs,
2.

The Court GRANTS the Motion for Court to Take Judicial

Notice;
3.

As to the Motion for Reconsideration, the Court gave the

Defendants until June 4, 1999 to file a response to the Plaintiffs'
Objection to F. Stanley Nielsen's Motion for Reconsideration (which
neither the Court nor the Defendants had received at the time of
the

hearing) .

The Court

will then take

that motion under

advisement;
4.

As to the Memorandums of Costs for these Defendants and

the Plaintiffs, the Court (1) gave the Plaintiffs until June 4,
1999 to file an affidavit with the Court detailing the costs of
defending against the counterclaim of F. Stanley Nielsen since its
filing and (2) gave the Defendants until Jvine 4, 1999 to file an
affidavit with the Court detailing the costs of defending against
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the Second Amended Complaint for Slander of Title, Quiet Title and
Declaration of Rights. The Court will then take the Memorandums of
Costs under advisement.
Though not an issue at the hearing, the Court had previously
taken the Memorandum of Costs (dated March 1, 1999) relating to a
previously dismissed Defendant, Lynn Nielsen, under advisement.
The Court had hoped to decide that issue at the same time as these
present Memorandums of Costs-(See Paragraph IV Other Motions in the
Court's previous Memorandum Decision and Order).
the

Court

gave

the parties

until

June

4 to

However, since
submit

further

information as the these present Memorandums of Costs, the Court
now decides the Memorandum of Costs of Lynn Nielsen.

The Court

DENIES such costs.
Such Memorandum of Costs only requested attorney fees.
Nielsen

alleges

that

the

complaint(s)

against

her

had

Ms.
been

"brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation."

Rule 54(e)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court does not find that circumstance here. Instead, the Court
finds that the Plaintiffs pursued this matter reasonably until the
Court issued the summary judgment dismissing her from the case.
Much of the information, necessary to prove the elements of slander
of title against Ms. Nielsen, was totally within her control. Ms.
Nielsen's actions regarding this property, prior to filing this
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action, may reasonably have given the Plaintiffs cause to believe
that she would slander title to this property.

However, no

evidence was ever found that Ms. Nielsen had done any action to
slander such title.
Further as to special damages, this Court has interpreted Ray
v.

Shull

Enterprises

Inc.,

108 Idaho 524, 530, 700 P.2d 567, 573

(1985), in a manner different than the interpretation of the
Plaintiffs.

However, the Court does net find the Plaintiffs were

unreasonable in their interpretation of the definition of special
damages.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED May 24, 1999.

tflDY SMITH
District Judge
Copies to:
F. Randall Kline
Daniel L. Hawkley
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EXHIBIT "I"

FINAL JUDGMENT OF JULY 16, 1999

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ONEJDA
REED L. PETERSEN INVESTMENT
COMPANY, a Utah Partnership,
ETHEL PETERSEN, general partner;
CURTIS PETERSEN, ROBERT
PETERSEN. DDCIE JACKSON, Limited
Partners: NORMAN L. PETERSEN
(deceased) and MAYME PETERSEN
and their successors in interest. BETTY
RUSSELL and LOUISE HARBINSON.
LAVERN H. PETERSEN and PERCY
E. PETERSEN,

Case No. CV-97-566

FINAL JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
-vsELWOOD L. NIELSEN, and
F. STANLEY NIELSEN,
Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW having been entered by the
Court in its Memorandum Decision and Order dated April 22, 1999,
JT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED THAT:
1. Summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' quiet title action be entered;
2. Judgment on the pleadings dismissing plaintiffs' slander of title claim, the declaratory
judgment claims, the prayer for an order to strike, etc., and the injunctive relief be entered; and
Final Judgment

Page 1

the injunctive relief be entered; and
3. Summary judgment dismissing the Counterclaim be entered.

DATED TmSy^PSay <^!fta999.

District Judge

Final Judgment
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EXHIBIT "J

MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER RE: COSTS AND FEES
SEPTEMBER 11, 1999

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ONEIDA
Register No. CV97-566
REED L. PETERSEN INVESTMENT
COMPANY, a Utah Partnership
ETHEL PETERSEN, general
partner; CURTIS PETERSEN,
ROBERT PETERSEN, DIXIE
JACKSON, Limited Partners,
NORMAN L. PETERSEN (deceased)
and MAYME PETERSEN and their
successors in interest
BETTY RUSSELL and LOUISE
HARBINSON, LAVERN H.
PETERSEN and PERCY E. PETERSEN
Plaintiffs,
MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER
RE: COSTS AND FEES

-vsELWOOD L. NIELSEN, and
F. STANLEY NIELSEN,
Defendants.
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On September 7, 1999, the Court heard the arguments of counsel
concerning costs and fees in this matter.
issue under advisement.

The Court then took the

The Court now decides the issue.
A.

The Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for Slander of Title on
February 21, 1997, for which they sought damages and an
injunction.

They also sought "a determination that the Agreement

of Option to Purchase Real Property is of no force and effect."
The Plaintiffs then amended their complaint, again filing an
"Amended Complaint for Slander of Title," with a similar prayer
for relief.

Upon receiving this Oneida County case, this Court

was then asked to determine what parts of it (if any) should be
dismissed.

In the May 18, 1999 hearing, the Court attempted to

determine that question.

At that time, counsel for the

Plaintiffs represented to the Court that this was not a quiet
title action, but instead only an action for slander of title
(even though the Court pointed out that Mr. Stanley Nielsen was
not a party to the previous "quiet title action" between other
parties and/or their predecessors to this action).

The Court

therefore finds that (1) the Plaintiffs1 action was for slander
of title (until the February 26, 1999 Second Amended Complaint),
(2) such an action would be a tort action, and (3) attorney fees
are awarded in such action in the discretion of the Court.
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There has also been a continuing issue concerning the
Court's jurisdiction over Mr. F. Stanley Nielsen in this matter.
While the Court (in Judge Harding's January 12, 1998 Memorandum
Decision and Order) found that it had personal jurisdiction over
Mr. Nielsen, it has been consistently disputed.

Only after the

Plaintiffs filed their February 26, 1999 Second Amended Complaint
(in which they alleged a quiet title action, a declaratory
judgment action, and a slander of title action) did Mr. Nielsen
agree to submit himself to this Court's jurisdiction.
This Court never made a final decision (after the filing of
the Amended Complaint for Slander of Title) as to its
jurisdiction over Mr. F. Stanley Nielsen.

However, it has

advised counsel in several hearings that a determination of the
validity of the assignment of the option (having no quiet title
action alleged against the Defendants) would not seem to be an
"action in rem," but rather one in which the Court would need "in
personam" jurisdiction.

Therefore until Mr. Nielsen's own

submission to its jurisdiction in March, 1999 when filing the
counterclaim for breach of contract, the Court questioned whether
it could determine the validity of the assignment of the option
in an alleged slander of title action.
As to the slander of title claim against these Defendants,
the Court finds that the Defendants are both prevailing parties.
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The Defendants have claimed no costs as a matter of right in
their Memorandums of Cost.

The Court also finds that neither

Defendant is entitled to discretionary costs.

The only

discretionary costs claimed by either Defendant were costs for
the mileage of counsel, claimed by Mr. F. Stanley Nielsen.

While

the Court finds that these costs were "necessary" and "reasonably
incurred," the Court does not find them to be "exceptional costs"
in defending in this matter.
As to attorney fees, the Court finds that (in order to be
awarded fees in the defense of a slander of title action) the
Plaintiffs must have brought or pursued the case "frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation."
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 54(e)(1) of the Idaho

Because much of the information

regarding the elements of the slander of title action (uttering
or publishing the statements, false statements, and malice) was
in the total control of the Defendants, the Court does not find
that the Plaintiffs brought or pursued this case in such manner
until the Court issued its December 9, 1998 Memorandum Decision
and Order.

The Court further believes that Mr. Elwood Nielsen's

actions, prior to filing the slander of title action against him,
may reasonably have given the Plaintiffs cause to believe that he
would have slandered title to this property.
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However, in the Courtfs December 9, 1998 Memorandum Decision
and Order, the Court found no slander of title action against Mr.
Stanley Nielsen.

Then the Plaintiffs again filed a slander of

title action against him in their Second Amended Complaint.

That

allegation, the Court believes was brought frivolously,
unreasonably, and without foundation.
As to the allegations for quiet title and declaratory
judgment in the Second Amended Complaint, the Court finds Mr.
Hawkley allowed those claims to be brought against Mr. Nielsen in
this Court.

Given Mr. Nielsen's response to them by filing his

own breach of contract counterclaim, the Court cannot find that
they were brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and
without foundation in this Court.

At some time, those claims

would have needed to have been resolved.

Mr. Nielsen chose to

resolve them here.
Reviewing the costs as detailed in Mr. F. Stanley Nielsen's
Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs, the Court therefore
awards him all of the costs incurred from January 5, 1999 until
February 8, 1999 and one half of the costs incurred from March
23, 1999 (after the Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended
Complaint on February 26, 1999) through June 18, 1999
(determining that one half of such costs were incurred in
defending the slander of title action and the other half in
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defending the quiet title action).

That amount totals $3,536.25.

The request for such attorney fees meets the requirements of Rule
54(e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, given
consideration of all of the factors outlined therein.

The Court

emphasizes the time and labor required, the novelty and
difficulty of the questions, the prevailing charges for like
work, the amount involved and the results obtained in making that
determination.
As to Mr. Elwood Nielsen, the Court cannot find that the
Plaintiffs brought and/or pursued this matter frivolously,
unreasonably, and without foundation.

The Court had some concern

about the pursuit of slander of title action after the February
8, 1999 hearing.

There, the Court informed the Plaintiffs that

they must allege damages which were different than the attorney
fees they were incurring in pursuing the slander of title action.
However, given Judge Harding's contrary prior rulings in this
matter, the Court finds it difficult to find that the Plaintiffs
brought or pursued the matter frivolously, unreasonably, or
without foundation.
B.
Mr. F. Stanley Nielsen brought an Amended Counterclaim for
breach of contract on November 21, 1998.

Such Amended

Counterclaim was withdrawn by Mr. Nielsen without the Plaintiffs
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ever filing an answer to it.

A counterclaim for breach of

contract was again filed in March, 1999.

On that counterclaim

the Court granted summary judgment in its April 22, 1999
Memorandum Decision and Order.

The Court therefore finds that

the Plaintiffs prevailed on that counterclaim.
The Plaintiffs claim no costs as a matter of right as to the
counterclaim.

The Court does not find that postage and copies

costs (incurred after March 22, 1999) are discretionary costs,
which should be awarded pursuant to Rule 54(d) (1) (D).

While they

may be necessary and reasonably incurred, they are not
exceptional costs incurred in the defense of this counterclaim.
As to an award of attorney fees on the counterclaim, the
Court finds that the Plaintiffs may only claim such fees based on
Idaho Code section 12-120(3), a civil action for recovery in any
commercial transaction.
Reviewing the costs as detailed in the Memorandum of Costs
for the Petersens, the Court, in its discretion, awards the
Plaintiffs $1,345.50.

That amount is determined by dividing in

two, those costs (which appear related to this defense) incurred
after the filing of the amended complaint for breach of contract
in March, 1999, beginning with the costs incurred on March 22,
1999.

The costs incurred on March 30, 1999 do not appear to be

related to the defense of the counterclaim.

The Court divided
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the costs in two, because the Plaintiffs were also pursuing their
own claims in incurring the costs outlined in that Memorandum.
The Court also finds that these costs meet the requirements
of Rule 54(e)(3).

They are appropriate when considering all of

the factors there outlined, especially the time and labor
required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions considered,
the prevailing charges for like work, and the amount involved and
the results obtained.
C.
While there have been other counterclaims brought herein,
they have been withdrawn by the Defendants prior to a decision by
the Court.

The Court therefore finds that there were no

prevailing parties as to those counterclaims.
The Defendants have also requested attorney fees under Idaho
Code section 12-123.

However, the Court believes that its award

of attorney fees (as explained in paragraph A) is the most that
should be awarded under Idaho Code section 12-123 for frivolous
conduct.

The Court, in its discretion, therefore declines any

further award.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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DATED September 11, 1999,

./RANDY 6MITH
District Judge

Copies to:
F. Randall Kline
Daniel L. Hawkley
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EXHIBIT "K

RULING OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
JANUARY 31,2000

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF.. WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
F. STANLEY NIELSEN,
RULING

Plaintiff,

J * * * * *

vs.
REED L. PETERSEN, et al. ,

Case No. 990900364
Defendants.

Defendant Curtis Petersen moves the court to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules

of Civil

Procedure,

and/or in

the alternative, for a more definitive statement and for sanctions.
Plaintiff moves the court for partial summary judgment.
Preliminarily, the court understands, from plaintiff's letter
"courtesy-copied" to this court, that plaintiff believes that
defendant's motion is essentially moot because of the subsequent
filing on October 15, 1999, of an amended complaint. Such an
argument is not properly before the court to prevent the court from
ruling on the motion to dismiss. More

importantly, however,

plaintiff has not received leave of court to file an amended
complaint. A party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course.
Rule 15, U.R.C.P.

Plaintiff filed the original complaint on January

19, 1999, and filed an amended complaint on February 26, 199 9.
Accordingly, plaintiff may not amend his^complaint without leave of
court, which he has not sought.
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Facts
The underlying dispute revolves around a lease of and option
to purchase real property located in Oneida County, Idaho (the
"Petersen farm"). Plaintiff's first cause of action stems from an
alleged breach of the option to purchase the Petersen farm. The
second cause of action is a claim for malicious prosecution from a
prior suit by defendant against plaintiff for slander of title of
the Petersen

farm. The court addresses each cause of action

individually.
Breach of Contract
Plaintiff contends that defendant breached the option to
purchase by not recognizing his attempt to exercise the option.
Both parties have submitted matters outside the pleadings and the
court treats the motion as one for summary judgment. Rule 12,
U.R.C.P.

Defendant argues (1) that defendant: was not party to the

option, and, thus, is not bound by it; (2) that this court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction because the property is located in the
state of Idaho; and

(3) that this matter has previously been

litigated and is barred by the doctrine of ices

judicata.

Although relatives of defendant signed the option to purchase,
defendant was never a party to the contract. Plaintiff contends,
however, that defendant was in privity with the original grantors
of the option. To support such, plaintiff files his own affidavit.
The affidavit

fails to provide any admissible

evidence that

defendant was in privity of contract with the original parties to
the contract. The affidavit simply states that plaintiff sent a
letter to defendant Curtis Petersen, "the personal representative

Ruling
Case No. 990900364
Page 3
of a deceased grantor of an option." Even viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (the plaintiff), as
required by law, plaintiff still fails to provide any evidence of
defendant's privity of contract. Plaintiff also fails to provide
any writing indicating the alleged privity, or any evidence or
argument setting out any other valid basis on which defendant is
liable, either in law or equity.
Next, simply because the real property is located in Idaho,
this

court

does

jurisdiction. See,
Notwithstanding,

not

loose,

e.g., Morris
because

of

automatically,
v. Sykes,
the

subject

matter

624 P.2d 681 (Utah 1981).

court's

other

rulings

are

dispositive of the case, the court does not need to rule on this
issue.
Additionally, defendant contends that the claim has already
been litigated and is therefore barred by the doctrine of res
judicata.

Plaintiff's predecessor in interest was sued by the

Petersen family in Oneida County to quiet title over the Petersen
farm. The Idaho court found that the subject lease was void.
Defendant was not a party to the Idaho suit and res judicata

would

not apply directly to him. If defendant were a successor in
interest to the lease and option (the court already ruled above
that plaintiff has failed to present any admissible evidence of
such), he would also be a successor in interest from his family's
prior suit over the lease and option with plaintiff. Accordingly,
res judicata,

if satisfied, would likewise bar plaintiff's instant

suit against defendant.
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Plaintiff argues that the ruling from the Idaho court simply
found that the "lease" was void, and that: the court failed to
address the "option." The Idaho court issued a "Decree Foreclosing
Mortgage and Ordering Sale" on April 16, 1993. The Idaho court
later found plaintiff in contempt for filing a "Notice of Interest
in Real Property" in the Petersen farm after it ordered the
foreclosing and the sale of the Petersen farm. The Idaho court
found that the notice was in contravention of its prior order
"relative to the affect and operation of the Lease and Option to
Purchase"(emphasis added) and held the notice of interest to be
void.
Furthermore, the Idaho court issued an "Order Quieting Title"
on June 14, 1996, holding that

ff

[t]he Petersens have full right,

title, and interest in [the Petersen Farm]. Plaintiff appealed the
Idaho court's rulings. The appeal was dismissed, however, on
November 7, 1996.
Subsequent to the first Idaho suit, the parties were involved
in a second Idaho suit (the "second Idaho court"). In that suit,
Curtis Petersen (along with others) sued the current plaintiff for
slander of title. Plaintiff counterclaimed, seeking relief based on
the lease and option. The second Idaho court ruled that the prior
Idaho ruling found that the lease and option were both void. The
second Idaho court clearly addressed the validity of the option.
Plaintiff counters, however, that the second Idaho court did not
have jurisdiction to make such a rulingu and that such a ruling on
the option would not be a full and fair ruling on the merits, as
required by the doctrine of res

judicata.
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The rulings of the two Idaho courts are clear and undisputed.
Both courts held the lease and option to purchase to be void. It is
not the place of this court to review the rulings of foreign courts
that clearly had jurisdiction, clearly considered the issues and
were subject to appeal in that state. The court finds that the
doctrine of res

judicata

applies and bars the cause of breach of

contract against defendant. See, e.g.,
Josephson,

Estate

of

Covington

v.

888 P. 2d 675 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994) (detailing the elements

of res judicata)

.
Malicious Prosecution

Plaintiff

claims

that

defendant

committed

the

tort

of

malicious prosecution by suing plaintiff in a slander of title suit
in the second Idaho suit. Both sides of the suit were dismissed
through summary judgment. Additionally, the Idaho court imposed a
sanction on defendant for his actions. The issue of any impropriety
with the slander suit have already been dealt with by a foreign
court and plaintiff fails to propose any valid justification why
the doctrine of res

judicata

would not also bar this claim.
Conclusion

Plaintiff clearly wants to exercise the option. He has,
however, already had his day in court. This court will not allow
defendant to "forum shop" in an attempt to overturn foreign courts'
unpleasant ruling. Plaintiff's ability and choices with respect to
appealing prior decisions rest solely with plaintiff. Defendant's
motion to dismiss is granted and plaintiff's claims are accordingly
dismissed. Defendant's motion, in the alternative, for a more
definite statement is moot; and the motion for sanctions is denied.
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Plaintiff and defendant have filed many other motions and
pleadings with the court, many of which contravene established
rules of procedure. Given the court's holding above, the court
considers the other motions moot.
Mr. Knowltoti will please prepare an appropriate order.
Dated this 3 V

day of January, 2000.

Parley Rv Baldwin, Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of January, 2000, I sent

a true and correct copy of the foregoing ruling to counsel as
follows:
David J. Knowlton
427 27th Street
Ogden, UT 84401
RobertthL Froerer
707 24 Street, Suite A
Ogden, UT 84401

Deputy Court Clerk

Pfifi

